Investigation into the Effects of Frequent Tax Policy Changes on Firm Risk by Tunnell, Perry Lawrence
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF FREQUENT 
TAX POLICY CHANGES ON FIRM RISK 
By: 
PERRY LAWRENCE TUNNELL 
Bachelor of Business Administration 
University of Texas at Arlington 
Arlington, Texas 
1981 
Master of Professional Accountancy 
University of Texas at Arlington 
Arlington, Texas 
1983 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma State Univer~ity 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for 
the Degree of 






C 0 P Y R I G H T 
by 
Perry Lawrence Tunnell 
December, 1990 
1394970 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF FREQUENT 
TAX POLICY CHANGES ON FIRM RISK 
Thesis Approved: 
Dean of the Graduate College 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express heartfelt gratitude to the members of my 
committee for their help during the conduct of this study. Many thanks 
to Dr. Larry Hammer for serving as my committee chairperson and guiding 
me through the production of this dissertation. Along with Dr. Hammer, 
the encouragement and comments (both substantive and editorial) of Dr. 
Jim Groff and Dr. Kevin Murphy have been invaluable, and they deserve a 
great deal of credit for their participation in this project. I would 
also like to thank Dr. Mary Gade .. arid Dr. David Weeks for their help and 
comments. 
My parents, Norma Lee Tunnell and Dr. Jim Tunnell, have encouraged 
me throughout my long career as a student, and for that I thank them. 
Thanks also to Dave Nichols ,for his help in the final stages of the 
production of this dissertation. 
Perhaps the person to whom I owe the most thanks is my wife Cindy. 
She was a constant source of support throughout my doctoral program. 
She was also always there to discuss any aspect of this dissertation, 
whether methodological or editorial. Not least in importance, she 
never asked me to read her dissertation in its entirety (and I returned 
the favor). 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 
I. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction . . 
Research Objective 
Importance of the Problem 
II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Determinants of Risk 
Studies Utilizing Market Ipformation to Test Tax 
Effects . . . . . . 
III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Development of Hypotheses 
The Effects of a History of Tax Changes on 
Unsystematic and Total Risk . . . . 
The Effect of a Pattern of Tax Changes on 
Systematic Risk 
Methodology . . . . 
The Sample , . . 
Variables Used to 
Total Risk 
Investigate Unsystematic and 








Limitations. and Suggestions for Future Research 
REFERENCES 
APPENDIXES 
APPENDIX A - RECENT MAJOR TAX ACTS 






























APPENDIX C - SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES 
INVESTIGATED 88 
APPENDIX D - THE SAMPLE COMPANIES AND THE CALCULATED 
VARIABLES 90 
APPENDIX E - CORRELATION ANALYSIS 95 
APPENDIX F - COLLINEARITY ANALYSIS 97 
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
I. Variables Selected by the St,epwise Procedure 
II. Regression Results: Risk Measure (Dependent 
Variable) = Total Risk 
III. Regression Results: Risk Measure (Dependent 
Variable) = Unsystematic Risk 
IV. Regression Results: Risk Measure (Dependent 
Variable) = Systematic Risk 
V. The Sample Companies and the Calculated Variables 
VI. Distribution of Sample Companies by SIC Code 
VII. Excluded Outliers 
VIII. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 1 
IX. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 2 
X. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 3 
XI. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 4 
XII. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 5 
XIII. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 6 
XIV. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 7 
XV. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 8 
XVI. Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression 9 




















LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 





THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Frequent changes in the tax laws have made estimates of the future 
returns from investment in a firm more uncertain. Tt is difficu,lt, if 
not impossible, to predict what changes to the tax laws will be made in 
the future because the process is driven largely by political consid-
erations. As a result of instability in the political process, major 
tax provisions have been enacted and repealed within the span of a few 
years. Since changes in the tax law can affect the cash flows of firms 
which in turn may affect the price of its stock [Madeo and Pincus, 
1985], returns to investors may be affected. For example, one recent 
study indicated that the impact of recent changes brought about by the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 shoul4 boost equity prices by ten to thirteen 
percent [Downs and. Hendershott, 1987]. The difficulty in predicting 
tax changes and their effect on a firm's cash flows introduces another 
area of uncertain~y to the estimation of potential returns on particu-
lar equity investments. 
Tax changes do not impact all firms equally. Some tax changes are 
meant to have the greatest effect on one particular industry or group 
of industries. An example of this type of change was the repeal of the 
law that had previously allowed banks to use a unique and very favor-
able method of computing bad debt expense for tax purposes. Other tax 
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changes may not be meant to target a specific industry or group of 
firms but nevertheless have a larger effect on the cash flows of some 
firms than those of other firms. This difference in effects might be 
the result of differences in the nature of the firms in question. For 
example, a change in dep~eciation rates would have a greater effect on 
the cash flows of capital- intensive firms ,'than those of labor- intensive 
firms. 
Unfortunately, the effects of tax changes that occur in one year 
may be wholly or partially offset by changes 'or reversals in tax policy 
in subsequent years. Such inconsistency makes it difficult to predict 
the effect of tax changes over the iong run. 
Research,Objec~ive 
A firm's expected cash flows partially determine the prices and 
returns of that firm's stock [Fama, 1972]. If the cash flows of some 
firms are more affec·ted by tax changes than those, of others, then the 
prices of the stocks of the more affected firms are more affected by 
tax changes. Since the prices of stocks have an effect on the measures 
of systematic, unsystematic, and total risk, the following question 
arises: have the effects of recent tax changes on the cash flows of 
firms in the United States had any significant effect on the systemat-
ic, unsystematic, or total risk of stocks? If some firms have been 
more significantly affected by ~ax changes over the years than other 
firms, the changes may have had an effect on the risk of the firms most 
greatly affected (henceforth referred to as "tax-change-affected" 
firms). 
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This study examines the relationship between a history of frequent 
tax-change-induced cash flow changes and systematic, unsystematic, and 
total risk. Many previous studies have shown that individual tax 
changes can produce abnormal returns around certain announcement dates 
[Madeo and Pincus, 1985; Ayres, 1982]. These studies have not suggest-
ed that isolated instances of abnormal returns significantly affected 
the risk of the stocks, nor have they investigated this possibility. 
One study has investigated changes in risk levels concurrent with the 
dates of introduction and passage of a single law concerning regulation 
in the gas industry, rather than a tax change [Chandy and Davidson, 
1986]. In that study no evidence of a significant shift in risk was 
found. 
Rather than focus on a single ·regulatory change, as Chandy and 
Davidson [1986] did, this study examines the relationship between the 
cash flow effects on a firm of a number of tax changes and the riski-
ness of that firm's stock. Specifically, this research addresses the 
following research questions: 
(1) Have the tax changes in re~ent years affected the total risk 
of the stocks o'f tax-change-affected firms? 
(2) Have the tax changes in recent years affected the systematic 
risk of the stocks of tax-change-affected firms? 
(3) Have the tax changes in recent years affected the unsystem-
atic risk of the stocks of tax-change-affected firms? 
These research questions all focus on the potential effects which 
a history of tax-induced changes in cash flows may have on the differ-
ent measures used to assess the risk of a firm's stock. 
The methodology by which these research questions were investi-
gated can be summarized as follows. A sample of firms was chosen, and 
three cross-sectional stepwise regressions were run. The dependent 
variable in the first regression was the variance of ret~rns, the 
dependent variable in the second regression was systematic risk, and 
the dependent variable in the third regression was unsystematic risk. 
The three regressions had a tota,l of nine independent variables avail-
able for selection by the stepwise procedure. All but one of these 
variables have been shown in prior studies to be related to risk. The 
other variable, the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total 
assets, was added to insure that the tax-change variab_les were not a 
proxy for the relative amount of property, plant, and equipment the 
firm possessed. 
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At this point outliers were excluded ,from the data set, and 
further regressions were run on the new data sets using the variables 
selected above, plus the tax-change variables. The exclusion of 
outliers had to be postponed until this point because the method used 
to select potential outliers [Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980] was 
dependent on the stability of the coefficients of the tax-change 
variables. The stepwise procedure, by limiting the number of variables 
in the final model, excluded sev~ral'variables that were potentially 
collinear with the tax-change variables of interest. This collinearity 
between the tax-change variables and some of the variables excluded by 
the stepwise procedure coula have made the coefficients in the model, 
and, therefore, also the identification of the outliers using the Bel-
sley, Kuh, and We~sch method, less reliable. 
The tax-change variables are measures of (1) the frequency of tax 
changes experienced by the firm in recent years, (2) the variability of 
the cash flow effect of recent tax changes, and (3) the effect of 
recent tax changes on the variance of cash flows. The hypotheses 
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stated in Chapter· III were then tested using the significance of the 
coefficients of the tax-change variables. The next sectiqn explains 
the importance of the research questions involved. 
Importance'of the Problem 
A finding ·of a significant relationship between a history of 
frequent tax changes and risk is important for several reasons. First, 
it may aid in the estimation of the risk of a stock. .As 'Foster [1986] 
points out, such estimates can be used (1) by investors in security 
investment decisions, (2) by managers in determining estimates of cost 
of capital for management decisions, and (3) by,regu~ators to help 
establish allowable returns in rate regulation cases. 
Second, the existence o.f a ~ositive relationship between frequent 
tax changes and risk might be of interest to policy makers. Assuming 
that investors are risk ave,rse and that increasingly frequent tax 
changes cause an increase in the risk of some firms relative to others, 
the stock prices of the affected firms are likely to be lower than they 
'otherwise would be. This ~ould·r~sult in a higher cost of capital for 
affected firms than unaffected firms: : To the ex-tent that the cost of 
capital has been raised, the affected firms would have to -either pass 
such increases in cost on to consumers in,the ~orm of higher output 
prices (which would l:ikely result in reduced demand for their prod-
ucts), or restrict expansio~ and production. Either of these alterna-
tives would likely reduce the~ -quantity of the firm's products consumed 
\ 
by society. In such a scenario, the relative fr,equency and variability 
of the cash-flow effects of tax changes affects the allocation of 
resources in the economy·. If such a~ effect does exist, policy-makers 
should be made aware of it so that the impact of frequent changes in 
the tax law on resource allocation can be specifically considered when 
tax legislation is proposed. 
The implications for policy-making of such a finding differ 
depending on which variable, the frequency of the tax changes or the 
magnitude of the effect of tax changes on the variability. of a firm's 
cash flows, is found to be significantly related to the risk of 
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stocks. If the frequen9y of tax changes is found to increase the risk 
of stocks, this might help persuade policy-makers to call for a morato-
rium on tax changes for a period of time. On the other hand, if the 
magnitude of the effect of tax changes on the variability of a firm's 
cash flows over time is found to be related to risk, this might help 
persuade policy-makers to make less drastic changes at any one time, or 
to allow for longer phase-in periods on the changes that they do make. 
In summary, the overall objective of this study is to empirically 
evaluate if the effects of tax changes on the cash flows of a firm are 
related to the riskiness of ~hat firm's stock. Prior research has 
shown that the variability of·a firm's cash flows is related to the 
riskiness of its stock [Rosenberg and Guy, 1976]. Numerous changes in 
the tax laws could affect the variability of cash flows for those 
companies most affected by the tax changes, which in, turn may affect 
their relative risk. 
The remainder of this dissertation is separated into four chap-
ters. Chapter II reviews the literature on (1) the determinants and 
measurements of risk and (2) the impacts of tax changes on the values 
of securities. Chapter III describes the theoretical framework under-
lying this research, the hypotheses that were tested, and the 
methodology used to test them. The results of the analysis are pre-
sented in Chapter IV. A summary of the conclusions of the study as 
well as the limitations appear in Chapter V. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature review is separated into two parts. In the first 
part, the empirical literature on 'the factors which affect risk are 
reviewed. The second part then reviews the empirical literature 
utilizing market information to study the effects of tax changes on 
security returns. 
Determinants of Risk 
This section begins with a brief discussion of the nature of risk 
in the context of financial investments and then reviews the literature 
on the factors that determine the risk of an investment. While there 
is no agreement in the financial community about exactly what risk is 
[Farrelly, Ferris and Reichenstein, 1985], there is general agreement 
that risk is associated with the degree of unpredictability of future 
returns 1 [Lorie and Hamilton, 1973]. Despite the disagreement in the 
financial community concerning the definition of risk, much of the 
literature about risk has focused on three interrelated measures of 
risk; systematic, unsystematic, and total risk [Foster, 1986]. 
1Returns, for the purposes of this study, a~e calculated according 
to 
rt = [ (Pt - Pt-1 + Dt) /Pt-d , 
where rt is the monthly rate of return for a stock during period t, Pt 
is the price of the stock at the end of period t, and Dt is the divi-
dend of the stock in period t. 
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Systematic risk is the covariability of the returns of an individ-
ual stock with the returns of the market. This covariability is gener-
ally operationalized as the covariance of the security's returns with 
the market returns, divided by the variance of the market returns 
[Foster, 1986]. In the market model (identified by equation (1), 
below) systematic risk is signifie'd by the coefficient of Rmt· The 
market model is commonly identified as follows: 
(1) 
where 
Rit return on security i over time period t; 
Rrot return on a market portfolio over time period t; 
uit unsystematic or residual portion of the return of firm i 
over time period t; 
a 1 intercept of linear relationship; and 
g1 slope of linear relationship. 
Since systematic risk is usually measured using the coefficient of Rmt. 
or g1 , a measurement of the systematic risk of a stock is often re-
ferred to as its "beta". 
Unsystematic risk is a measure of the portion of a stock's price 
volatility that is not related to the movement of the market. It is 
operationalized as the variance of the residual in the market model, or 
a2 (uit) [Sharpe, 1964]. At the individual security level, it has been 
shown on average to account for 70% of the total variance in a securi-
ty's return, while systematic risk accounts for the other 30% [Sharpe 
(1978)]. 
While u~systematic risk' is less often the focus of study than 
total or systematic risk, Frankfurter and Booth [1985] have provided 
evidence of its importance in investment decisions. They ranked a 
total of 1,457 common stocks in descending order based on their level 
of unsystematic risk. From this ranking they separated the stocks into 
15 different groups. Using the techniques developed by Markowitz 
[1952] and Sharpe [1963] they then selected a Markowitz-Sharpe effi-
cient portfolio (MSEP) from each of the 15 groups of stocks. 
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Previous research [Frankfurter and Frecka, 1979] had shown that 
portfolios selected according to the Markowitz-Sharpe model outperform 
the "market portfolio" as measured by several of the more well known 
stock market indexes. The unsystematic risk of these "market portfo-
lios" had been completely diversified away. For the MSEP's, on the 
other hand, it has been shown [Frankfurter, 1981] that unsystematic 
risk makes up at least 20 to 25 percent of total risk. To underscore 
the importance of unsystematic risk to MSEP's, it should be pointed out 
that the estimation of total risk, which includes both systematic and 
unsystematic risk, is neeessary in the process of selecting MSEP's. 
For these portfolios, Franfurter and Frecka found that the rela-
tionship between re,turn (either ex ante or ex post) and unsystematic 
risk was actually stronger than the relationship between return and 
systematic risk. They also calculated the difference between expected 
(ex ante) return and actual (ex post) return. This difference was 
called the expectation bias.' They found that the relationship between 
the expectation bias and unsystematic risk was also stronger than that 
between the expectation bias and sys:tematic risk. 
The total risk of a security is usually operationalized as the 
variance of the security's returns, or a 2 (R1t) [Sharpe, 1964]. Total 
risk is actually a function of systematic and unsystematic risk. The 
market model, as stated before, is as follows., 
Rl.t = Ql. + Bl.Rmt + Ul.t 






Moving the ~i outside the parentheses, the following is obtained; 
(4) 
The importance of any of these different types of risk to an 
investor considering a security·as an investment generally depends on 
the level of diversification of the investor's portfolio. The addi-
tional risk undertaken by an investor who purchases a security is that 
security's contribution to the unpredictability of future returns 
associated with an individual's entire portfolio, or the overall 
portfolio risk [Dyckman and Morse, 1986]. The additional portfolio 
risk undertaken because of the purchase of an individual security 
depends in part on whether or not 'the portfolio is diversified. This 
relationship can be,operationalized as [Sharpe,l964]: 
n n 
0'2 (pt) = [ ~ (Xit~i) 2 ] 0'2 <Rmt) + ~ [Xit 20'2 ( Ul.t) ] (5) 
i=l i=l 
where Pt is the return of the entire portfolio of n securities during 
period t and Xl.t is the fraction of the entire portfolio accounted for 
by the investment in security i during period t. As the Xl.t's become 
smaller (as the portfolio becomes more diversified) the far right term 
approaches zero, and the other term on the right side of the equals 
sign approaches the variance of the market returns. 
As can be seen from equation (5), if an individual security is the 
only security in a portfolio, then X1t equals one, and the right side of 
equation (5) collapses to equal the right side of equation (4). In 
such a case, the left sides of the two equations would be equal, and 
the individual security's contribution to the investor's overall 
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portfolio risk would be the total risk of the security. If, on the 
other hand, a portfolio is fully diversified, then the addition to the 
risk of the portfolio caused by the inclusion of an individual security 
in the portfolio is dependent on the covariability of the returns of 
the individual security with the returns of the market, or its B. 
Because of the importance of risk in the investment decision, 
there have been many attempts to model the risk of individual invest-
ments. While most of these studies have focused on systematic risk 
[Foster, 1986], several have attempted to model total risk [Ang, 
Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; Christie, 1982; Melicher, Rush, and Winn, 
1976; Winn, 1977]. 
Various factors have been studied to determine the relationship 
between those factors and the systematic and total risk of investments 
in common stocks. Previous studies have used several different schemes 
to classify these factors. These·factors can be categorized as fol-
lows: (1) firm-specific accounting-based variables [Ang, Peterson and 
Peterson, 1985; Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes, 1970; Ben-Zion and 
Shalit, 1975; Bildersee, 1975; Christie, 1982; Hamada, 1972; Logue and 
Merville, 1972; Melicher, 1974; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Patel and 
Olsen, 1984; Pettit and Westerfield, 1972; Rosenberg and McKibben, 
1973; Turnbull, 1977; Winn, 1977], (2) other non-accounting firm-
specific variables [Ang, Peterson and Pete~son, 1985; Ben-Zion and 
Shalit, 1975; Fabozzi and Francis, 1979; Gordon, 1962; Lev, 1974; 
Mandelker and Rhee, 1984; Melicher, 1974; Melicher, Rush and Winn, 
1976; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Patel and Olsen, 1984; Rosenberg and 
Mckibben, 1973; Winn, 1977], and (3) macroeconomic variables [Robichek 
and Cohn, 1974] . 
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The accounting-based variables that have been investigated to 
determine their relationship to the systematic and total risk of a firm 
include (1) variability of earnings [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; 
Bildersee 1975; Patel and Olsen, 1984; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973], 
(2) accounting beta [Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 
1975, Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973], (3) growth [Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975; Logue and Merville, 1972; Moyer and 
Chatfield, 1983; Pettit and Westerfield, 1972; Rosenberg and Mckibben, 
1973; Turnbull, 1977], (4) leverage [Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975; Ben-Zion and 
Shalit, 1975; Christie, 1982; Hamada, 1972; Logue and Merville, 1972; 
Patel and Olsen, 1984; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973; Moyer and Chat-
field, 1983], (5) firm size [Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; Beaver, 
Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; Fabozzi and 
Francis, 1979; Melicher, 1974; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Logue and 
Merville, 1972; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973; Winn, 1977], and (6) 
dividend payout [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Logue and Merville, 
1972; Melicher, 1974; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973; Pettit and Wester-
field 1972; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983]. Any association between these 
variables and total, systematic or unsystematic risk supports the 
hypothesis that accounting-based data reflect the underlying character-
istics of the firm which determine risk [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 
1970]. 
All of the above variables can be viewed as measures that attempt 
to indicate some aspect of the total expected variability of the firm's 
future stream of cash flows. Since the firm's cash earnings can be 
derived from accounting earnings by adjusting for depreciation and 
similar accounting variables [Fama and Miller, 1972], the firm's 
earnings variability should be related to the firm's cash flow vari-
ability, and therefore its variability of returns. Rosenberg and 
McKibben [1973] found that earnings variability was, in fact, related 
to variance of returns, or total risk. 
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While there is no direct relationship between the variability of a 
firm's earnings and systematic risk, Bowman [1979] showed analytically 
that there should be an indirect relationship between these two mea-
sures. Confirming Bowman's analytical work, empirical studies have 
consistently found a significant relationship between the variability 
of the firm's earnings and the magnitude' of the systematic risk of the 
firm's stock [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee 1975; Patel 
and Olsen, 1984; Rosenberg and Mc~ibben, 1973]. Since the variability 
of both corporate earnings and corporate cash flows can be affected by 
tax changes, a relationship may exist between the risk of a firm and 
the history of tax changes which affect it's cash flows. 
The relationship between accounting beta (the covariability of 
reported earnings with the reported earnings of a market portfolio) and 
systematic risk is dependent on the relationship between the firm's 
earnings and the earnings of the market as a whole. Theoretically, the 
more closely a firm's earnings mirror the earnings of a market portfo-
lio, the more closely its price fluctuations should mirror those of the 
market portfolio. Two previous studies have found a significant 
correlation between accounting beta and systematic risk [Beaver, 
Kettler, and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975]. While Rosenberg and 
McKibben [1976] did not find a significant relationship between system-
atic risk and accounting beta, they did find a significant relationship 
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between total risk and accounting beta. However, the model in which 
Rosenberg and McKibben found no significant relationship between 
accounting beta and systematic risk had 31 other variables, so it is 
possible that collinearity with one of these other variables caused the 
accounting beta coefficient to appear insignif~cant. 
The relationship between growth and systematic risk is the subject 
of some disagreement. Growth is usually defined as the change in 
sales, earnings, or assets from year to year. According to analytical 
work by Turnbull [1977], growth should be negatively correlated with 
systematic risk. One of Turnbull ':s asswnptions was that the expected 
growth of a firm's cash flows are constant. This asswnption is con-
trary to the theoretical analysis used by Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 
[1970], as explained below, and might explain why the two studies came 
to different conclusions as to the theoretical relationship between 
growth and risk. Turnbull's stu~y was strictly analytical, and did 
not attempt to empirically verify the proposed relationship between 
growth and systematic risk. 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes [1970] hypothesized that growth should 
be positively correlated with sy~tematic risk. Their basis for this 
position was that high growth is associated with areas of the economy 
where high levels of profit are expected. Preswnably, large expected 
profits provide incentives to invest, which in·turn result in a high 
growth rate. Where there are larger than normal profits and no signif-
icant barriers to entry in the market, more firms will enter the market 
to take advantage of these abnormal profits. Output will increase, 
forcing prices and the level of profits down. Because of this process, 
Beaver, Kettler and Scholes argue that streams of excessive earnings 
are more uncertain than the "normal" earnings streams of other firms, 
and the stock of higher-growth firms is thus riskier than that of 
lower-growth firms. 
When growth is measured in terms of the change in the amount of 
assets, the evidence has sometimes shown a significant relationship 
between growth and systematic risk [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; 
Bildersee; 1975]. Where growth is measured in terms of changes in 
sales or earnings per share, the results are also varied, with some 
studies finding a significant relationship [Ro~enberg and McKibben, 
1973; Moyer and, Chatfield, 1983]. and others finding no evidence of a 
relationship [Pettit and Westerfield, 1972; Logue and Merville, 1972]. 
Rosenberg and McKibben [1973] also found no significant relationship 
between growth (in sales and earnings per share) and total risk. 
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The relationship between levera·ge and systematic risk has been the 
subject of a large amount of research, both theoretical and empirical. 
Analytical research has indicated that as debt is introduced, the 
future cash flows to equity holders become more variable [Modigliani 
and Miller, 1958]. The empirical literature is virtually unanimous in 
its finding of a significant positive relationship between leverage and 
systematic risk [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975; 
Patel and Olsen, 1984; Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; Hamada, 1972; Logue 
and Merville, 1972; Rosenberg and MpKibben, 1973; Moyer and Chatfield, 
1983]. A significant relationship between leverage and total risk has 
also been found by researchers [Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; 
Rosenberg and M~Kibben, 1973]. 
The analytical arguments supporting the existence of a relation-
ship between firm size and risk are based on evidence that indicates 
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that the default risk of large firms is generally less than that for 
small firms. Presumably, if returns for individual investments are not 
perfectly correlated, the cash flows of larger firms (with a greater 
number of investments) will have a lower varianc~ than the cash flows 
of smaller firms. If the investment returns are independent, the 
variance of the overall returns will decrease proportionally as size 
increases [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970]. 
The empirical results of investigations of the relationship 
between firm size and systematic risk have'also been mixed. When firm 
size is measured as the natural logarithm of the assets of the firm, 
most researchers have found a significant relatiqnship between size and 
systematic risk [Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; Melicher, 1974; 
Logue and Merville, 1972], but some have not [Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes, 1970; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983]. Research has also shown a 
significant relationship between firm size, measured as total assets, 
and total risk [Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; Rosenberg and 
McKibben, 1973; Winn, 1977]. 
When size is measured by the natural logarithm of sales and 
systematic risk is the dependent variable, the size variable has gene-
rally been found to be insignificant [Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; 
Fabozzi and Francis, 1979; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983]. If size is 
measured by the market value of the firm's equity, it has also been 
found to be unrelated to systematic risk [Bildersee, 1975]. Based on 
the empirical evidence to date, the relationship between systematic 
risk and the natural logarithm of total assets is stronger than the 
relationship between systematic risk and either total sales or the 
market value of the firm's equity. 
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Dividend payout has also been investigated as being related to 
systematic and total risk. Because of aversion to reducing the divi-
dend, management presumably sets the dividend so that there is a low 
probability of earnings ever falling below the dividend level. If this 
scenario is realistic, then the dividend is a surrogate for manage-
ment's assessment of the lower range of earnings [Beaver, Kettler, and 
Scholes, 1970; Petit and Westerfield, 1972]. The empirical literature 
has largely suppqrted the ,existence of a negative relationship between 
systematic risk and dividend payout [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; 
Melicher, 1974; Pettit and Westerfield 1972; Moyer and Chatfield, 
1983]. However, there have been systematic risk studies that found the 
dividend payout ratio to be insignificant [Logue and Merville, 1972; 
Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973]. The one study that investigated the 
relationship between total risk and the dividend payout ratio found the 
relationship to be signifi~ant [Rosenberg ,and McKibben, 1973]. 
Other studies have attempted tQ determine if systematic and total 
risk are related to other non-accounting firm-specific variables. 
These variables include: (1) market activity [Ben-Zion and Shalit, 
1975; Melicher, 1974; Patel and Olsen, 1984], (2) dividend record [Ben-
Zion and Shalit, 1975; Fabozzi and Francis, 1979; Gordon, 1962], (3) 
the industry in which the firm operates [Fabozzi and Francis, 1979], 
(4) market concentration [Melicher, Rush, and Winn, 1976; Moyer and 
Chatfield, 1983; Winn, 1977], and (5) operating leverage [Ang, Peter-
son, and Peterson, 1985; Lev, 1974; Mandelker and Rhee, 1984]. 
The theoretical relationship between market activity and risk is 
not clear-cut. Patel and Olsen [1984] suggest that marketability 
refers to the availability of willing buyers at near the current market 
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value. If a security is highly marketable, an investor should be able 
to sell his investment in that security without large reductions in 
price. Patel and Olsen suggested that the more marketable a security 
is, the less variable the capital gain portion of the investor's return 
would be. They therefore expected to find an inverse relationship 
between systematic risk and.marketability. 
Ben-Zion and Shalit [1975], on the other hand, maintain that a 
high level of tra~ing activity reveals that investor's expectations 
with respect'to the distribution of future stock returns are very 
diverse. They theorized that this diversity of opinion causes higher 
trading intensity, and that as a_consequence there should be a rela-
tionship between the uncertainty with respect to future returns, or 
risk, and the trading'intensity of a given stock. 
The stock turnover ratio (shares traded divided by shares out-
standing) has been used as a surrogate for both marketability and 
trading activity. Melicher [1974], looking strictly at electric 
utilities, found a significant positive relationship between systematic 
risk and stock turnover. Other studies have found the relationship to 
be insignificant [Patel and Olsen, 1984]. 
Several links between risk and the dividend record, or the number 
of years the firm has maintained uninterrupted dividend payments, have 
been suggested. First, var·ious studies have shown that firms' dividend 
payments are significantly related to earnings stability [Gordon, 
1962]. Second, a firm's dividend record may reflect its growth and 
expansion plans, since growth can be financed with earni~gs retained in 
the business instead of paid out in dividends. Third, the length of 
continuous dividend payments is often reflective of the age of the 
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firm, which may be interpreted as an indication of the strength of 
established market positions [Fabozzi and Francis, 1979]. The studies 
that have been done concerning dividend record have indicated that it 
is inversely related to the risk of the firm [Ben-Zion and Shalit, 
1975; Fabozzi and Francis, 1979]. However, these studies have omitted 
from their models other important variables, such as size (measured by 
total assets), dividend payout ratio, and,earnings variability, for 
which the dividend record might be a proxy. 
The industry ,in which the firm operates could theoretically be 
related to the expected variability of future cash flows through the 
growth, leverage ,and size factors. These variables could, in turn, be 
related to the industry of the firm. The growth of the firm could be 
dependent on the industry in which it competes [Fabozzi and Francis, 
1979]. Also, competitive conditions in a particular industry could 
cause the firms within that industry to have similar leverage ratios 
and be of similar size. 
Thus, the characteristics of a firm could be related to its indus-
try affiliation. Since risk has been shown to be dependent on the 
characteristics of a firm, it follows that there could be a relation-
ship between industry affiliation and risk. Fabozzi and Francis did 
find, for a few industr:ies, a rel,ationship between the industry in 
which a firm operates and the systematic risk of the firm. However, 
the model they used contained only two significant variables other than 
the industry-specific binary variables, indicating that their model 
might have been misspecified (that is, lacking,some significant vari-
ables). For the few industries for which a significant relationship 
between systematic risk and the industry of the firm was found, the 
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binary (dummy) industry variable might have been a proxy for a missing 
variable or set of variables. 
The number of competitors in the market in which a firm operates 
is thought to be linked to the risk of the firm because of the use of 
limit pricing as a barrier to entry in concentrated industries. Under 
limit pricing, prices are adjusted to maximize profits, but such price 
adjustments are subject to the constraint that prices be kept low 
enough to discourage entry into the market by new competitors. When 
limit pricing is used, unfavorable market shocks can be passed along to 
the customers, but favorable market shocks are likewise passed to the 
customers since the price must be kept low to discourage entry by 
competitors. The net effect is that risk tends to be borne by the 
firm's customers through price variation rather than by its creditors 
and owners through profit (and cash flow) variation. Evidence indicat-
ing an inverse relationship between market concentration and systematic 
risk has been found [Moyer and Chatfield, 1983]. Studies have also 
shown a relationship between"market concentration and total risk 
[Melicher, Rush, and Winn, 1976; Winn, 1977]. 
Operating leverage is the ratio of fixed to variable costs [Fos-
ter, (1986)],. If fixed costs are higher relative to variable costs, 
the firm has less flexibility, and will be less able to adapt to 
changing conditions. If the economy is healthy and sales increase, 
fixed costs per unit will decrease, and profit per unit should also 
increase. On the other hand, if the economy is not healthy and sales 
decrease, fixed costs per unit will increase, and profit per unit will 
decrease. This behavior tends to exaggerate the earnings swings of 
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firms with higher operating leverage, and thus increase both systematic 
and total risk. 
Lev [1974] found a significant relationship between operating 
leverage and both systematic and total risk, but operating leverage was 
the only variable in Lev's model, and he only investigated companies in 
three industries. Mandelker and Rhee [1984]-only found a significant 
relationship between operating leverage and systematic risk, and this 
finding of significance was dependent upon the manner in which the 
stocks were segregated into portfolios. Additionally, the sample in 
the Mandelker and,Rhee study was. made up of only manufacturing firms, 
and financial leverage was the only other.variable in the model used, 
so the model might have been misspecified. Ang, Peterson, and Peterson 
[1985] used a model wrth four variables besides the operating risk 
variables, and selected their sample from all non-regulated industries. 
They found no consistent relationship between operating leverage and 
either systematic risk or total.risk. 
There has also been an attempt to relate the risk of firms to 
macroeconomic variables. Robichek and Cohn [1974] showed in their 
theoretical analysis that it was likely that the risk of a firm would 
change with changes in macroeconomic variables. After considering the 
alternatives, they decided to limit the variables studied to the rate 
of inflation and the rate of real growth of the economy. _Their empiri-
cal tests indicated that the systematic risk of a small number of firms 
does depend, over time, on the rate of inflation and the rate of real 
growth in the economy. 
For some of the above variables, the empirical support for a 
relationship with either total or systematic risk is unanimous, and 
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there were no questionable methodological issues associated with the 
studies that investigated them. These variables were earnings vari-
ability [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee 1975; Patel and 
Olsen, 1984; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973], leverage [Beaver, Kettler 
and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975; Patel and Olsen, 1984; Ben-Zion and 
Shalit, 1975; Hamada, 1972; Logue and Merville, 1972; Rosenberg and 
McKibben, 1973; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983], and market concentration 
[Melicher, Rush, and Winn, 1976; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Winn 1977]. 
For some other variables, the preponderance of the evidence indi-
cates that there is a relationship between these other variables and 
total or systematic risk, and the studies involved also had no unre-
solved methodological issues. These variables were accounting beta 
[Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 1975; Rosenberg and 
McKibben, 1973], growth [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Bildersee, 
1975; Logue and Merville, 1972; Pettit and Westerfield, 1972; Moyer and 
Chatfield, 1983; Rosenberg and McKibben, 1973], asset size [Ang, 
Peterson, and Peterson, 1985; Beaver,,,Kettler and Scholes, 1970; Logue 
and Merville, 1972; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Rosenberg and McKibben, 
1973], and dividend payo~t ratio [Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970; 
Logue and Merville, 1972; Moyer and Chatfield, 1983; Rosenberg and 
McKibben, 1973]. 
The evidence outlined above indicates that all of the, above vari-
ables should be considered when risk is being modeled. For other 
variables the evidence of a relationship with risk is mixed or incon-
clusive. Different studies have found the relationship between stock 
turnover and systematic risk to be significant [Melicher, 1974] and 
insignificant [Patel and Olsen, 1984]. As indicated previously, 
Melicher's findings are of questionable generalizability since his 
entire sample consisted of electric utilities. 
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The conclusions of the studies finding a positive relationship 
between systematic risk and dividend record [Ben-Zion and Shalit, 1975; 
Fabozzi and Francis, 1979] are also questionable. These studies used 
at most two variables other than dividend record in their models, so 
the models might have been misspecified. Specifically, their models 
did not include variables such as size, earnings variability, or 
dividend payout ratio, variables for which the dividend record might be 
a proxy. 
The one study that investigated the effect of the industry of the 
firm on systematic risk also used a model with only three variables, 
leaving out asset size, industry concentration, earnings variability, 
and several other variables mentioned previously for which industry 
could be a proxy [Fabozzi and Francis, 1979]. Operating leverage is 
another variable which some .studies found to be significantly related 
to systematic risk in models with a very limited number of variables 
[Lev, 1974; Mandelker and Rhee, 1984]. However, when variables such as 
size, dividend payout ratio, and financial leverage were included in 
the model being used, operating leverage was found to be insignificant 
[Ang, Peterson, and Peterson, 1985] 
The literature reviewed above indicates that many variables have 
been investigated to determine if they are significantly related to 
risk. Some have been found to be significantly associated with·total 
and/or systematic risk, while others have not. The evidence indicates 
a significant relationship between total and/or systematic risk and 
earnings variability, accounting beta, growth, financial leverage, size 
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(measured as total assets), dividend payout ratio, and market concen-
tration. In general, these variables have been thought to affect risk 
through their effect on the variability of cash flows. The propensity 
of some firms to be more greatly affected by tax changes is another 
variable that might affect the variability of cash flows, and thus 
risk. 
Studies Utilizing Market Information 
. to Test Tax Effec~s 
For a history of frequent tax changes to influence the risk of 
stocks it is necessary for a history of tax changes to have affected 
the prices, and thus the returns, of stocks. This is because the 
measures of total, systematic, and unsystematic risk are dependent on 
returns (see equations 2 through 4), .and returns are dependent on 
prices (see footnote 1). Only one study, Chandy and Davidson [1986], 
has investigated the effect on risk of changes in the law. They used a 
dummy variable regression model to. investigate whether or not the 
introduction or passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act caused any 
significant shift in the systematic risk of natural gas firms, but 
found no evidence of such a shift. They also used security price 
movement information in their study of the effects of deregulation of 
natural gas on the returns and risk of stocks in the natural gas 
industry. Their investigation of the abnormal and cumulative abnormal 
returns on or near the event dates revealed no significant stock price 
reaction to the introduction or the passage of the Natural Gas Policy 
Act. 
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While only one study [Chandy and Davidson, 1986] has investigated 
the effect of tax or other law changes on the risk of stocks, various 
other studies have used financial market information to investigate the 
effects of tax changes on the values and returns of stocks. Although 
he used no empirical data to demonstrate the technique, Schwert [1981] 
recognized and expanded on the possible uses of security price informa-
tion in the evaluation of the effects of unanticipated changes in 
regulation. 
Schipper and Thompson [1983] investigated the market reaction to 
both regulatory and tax changes. They investigated the impact on 
merger-engaged firms of the Williams Amendments to the securities laws, 
the 1969 Tax Reform Act, Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinions 16 
and 17, and the SEC's segment disclosure rules. Investigating abnormal 
returns calculated using a generalized least squares procedure, they 
found that the Williams Amendments and the 1969 Tax Reform Act had a 
significant effect on the returns of companies engaged in merger 
activity. The effects on the returns of such firms of APB Opinions 16 
and 17 and the SEC's segment disclosure rules were found to be insigni-
ficant. 
Other studies have dealt specifically with market reactions to, 
actual tax changes. Bathke, Rogers, and Stern [1985] analyzed the 
impact of four tax acts on "flower" bond2 prices using a capital mar-
kets methodology. The cumulative abnormal returns of these flower 
bonds on the dates surrounding certain tax acts were studied. The 
results indicated that tax-induced market reactions did take place. 
2 "Flower" bonds are bonds for which there are special estate tax 
advantages upon the death of the owner. 
However, results concerning the commencement dates of the market 
reactions were mixed. 
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Rather than focus on a change in the statutory tax laws, Madeo and 
Pincus [ 1985] examined the marke.t reactions to changes in Internal 
Revenue SerVice procedural guidelines. They investigated the effect of 
the issuance and subsequent recall of Revenue Procedure 80-55 on the 
stock price movements of a selection of banks [Madeo and Pincus, 
1985]. Because all of the stocks were in the same industry, it was 
necessary to use a seemingly unrelated regressions approach to identify 
effects. Unlike similar event studies, it. was possible to estimate the 
direct cash flow effect of the announcements. In fact, the "bad news" 
announcements were only detectible when the magnitude of the direct 
cash flow impact was included in the ~odel. The effects of the "good 
news" announcements were detectible whether the magnitude of the direct 
cash flow impact was included in the model or not. 
The seemingly unrelated regressions approach was also used by 
Manegold and Karlinsky [1988] to study the effects of changes to the 
tax laws concerning the advantageous treatment of revenues generated by 
possessions corporations (i.e., corporations doing bu~iness in Puerto 
Rico). They found that for companies that owned these possessions 
corporations there were significant market reactions to the legislative 
progress of these changes at three critical dates. These three dates 
corresponded to the passa~e of related changes by the Senate Finance 
Committee, the full Senate, and a Joint Conference Committee. Manegold 
and Karlinsky also used the residuals of the seemingly unrelated 
regressions to estimate the total impact of the changes on the market 
value of the effected companies. They found that this estimated impact 
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on market value was fairly close to the present value of the additional 
tax revenue estimated by the Treasury to result from these changes. 
Market reactions to changes in the tax laws concerning percentage 
depletion and th~ investment tax credit have also been investigated. 
Lyon [1986] investigated the abnormal returns of stocks in connection 
with the 1969 reduction in the percentage depletion allowance and the 
four changes in the investment tax credit from 1966 to 1971. He found 
significant declines in the value of oil companies at the time of 
Congressional action on percentage depletion. Further, a significant 
association between increases in the share value of firms and their 
expected receipt of investment credits was found. Ayres [1982] had 
previously found a statistically significant association between 
abnormal security price performance and the level of tax credit benefit 
received or lost as a result of the above legislation. 
The effects on stock prices of the passage of the safe harbor 
rules for leases under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 have been 
investigated by Owers ~nd Rogers [1985] and by Shaw [1986]. In both of 
these studies, the returns of a sample of firms that announced partici-
pation in safe harbor lease transactions during 1981 were investigated 
for evidence of any abnormality over the period in which the safe 
harbor lease transaction was announced. Both studies found a negative 
price reaction near the announcement date for the lessors (buyers). 
While Shaw found positive abnormal returns for the lessees (sellers) 
near the announcement date, Owers and Rogers found no evidence of 
abnormal returns near that date for the lessees. 
Market reactions to tax law changes brought about by court deci-
sions have also been studied. The impact on stock returns of the 
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Supreme Court decision prohibiting the use of the lower of cost or 
market method of valuing excess inventories was investigated by Wilkie 
[1984]. Using questionnaires to obtain confidential tax return infor-
mation, this study found that firms affected by the mandated change in 
tax accounting methods suffered statistically significant declines in 
value relative to similar, but unaffected firms. 
The market effects of the removal of the w~thholding tax on inter-
est paid by Canadian corporations-to non-Canadian debt holders was 
studied by Brean [1984]. The effects of this 1975 change were studied 
by investigating the differentials in the U.S. and Canadian yields for 
corporate and government bonds. The Canadian corporate/government bond 
yield differential dropped significantly after the repeal of withhold-
ing, indicating that the original provision had increased the cost of 
capital for Canadian firms. 
The effect of the Tax Reform Act. of 1986 on the valuation of 
equity securities has been estimated using a cash flow model. One 
factor in this analysis was that -the elimination of the investment tax 
credit and the lengthening of depreciation periods favors existing 
investment over new investment. From the cash flow model it was 
estimated that stock prices would increase by ten to thirteen percent 
because of the 1986 Act [Downs and Hendershott, 1987] 
The literature reviewed in this chapter indicates that a large 
number of factors have been investigated to determine their impact on 
the risk of stocks. The literature also shows 'that an individual tax 
change can have a significant effect on the prices of stocks ~ffected 
by the tax change. In fact, the literature shows that even the passage 
of a change by a Congressional committee or the news that a change is 
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contemplated by policy makers can have a significant effect on the 
prices of stocks affected by the change. Given the potential stock 
price effects of individual tax changes, it seems possible that if some 
firms have been more frequently affected by tax changes, or if tax 
changes have had a more variable effect' on the cash flows of some firms 
than others, the returns of the more affected firms might be signifi-
cantly riskier than the returns of the less affected firms. However, 
there is an absence of research into the relationship between the 
frequency and the variability of the cash flow effects of tax changes 
and the concurrent levels of risk of individual stocks. 
The theoretical framework underlying this research and the method-
ology used to test the hypotheses are explained in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Development of Hypotheses 
As explained in Chapter II, tax changes can have an effect on the 
returns of stocks. A history of tax changes might therefore have an 
effect on a stock's measures of total, unsystematic, or systematic 
risk, since these measures are dependent on the returns to a stock. 
The Effects of a History of Tax Changes on 
Unsystematic and Total Risk 
Unsystematic risk is operationalized as the variance of the error 
term in the market model. As given in Chapter II, the market model is 
commonly identified as follows: 
(1) 
where, 
R1 t return on security i during time period t; 
Rrot return on a market portfolio during time period t; 
uit unsystematic or residual portion of the return of security i 
during time period t; 
ai intercept of linear relationship; and 
g1 slope of linear relationship. 
Unsystematic risk is a measure of the portion of a stock's price 
volatility that is not related to the movement of the market. It is 
operationalized as the variance of the residual in the market model, or 
u2 (u1 t) [Sharpe, 1964]. It follows that any factor that increases the 
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deviation of a s-tock's returns from a linear correlation with the 
movement of the market returns increases unsystematic risk. Thus, any 
factor that causes price movements which are independent of the market 
movement should increase unsystematic risk. These stock price changes 
can occur when new information, ip this case concerning the possible 
effect of tax changes on the firm's cash flows, becomes available [Ball 
and Brown, 1968]. There are four stages at .which such new information 
might produce relatively greater price changes for tax-change-affected 
firms. 
First, when economic and political developments indicate that a 
tax change is probable, the stock prices of tax-change-affected firms 
should show more movement than non-tax-change-affected firms as a tax 
change becomes likely. Investors are likely to anticipate that firms 
affected by tax changes in the past will be affected by a likely, but 
as yet unknown, future tax change. 
Second, the stock prices-of tax-change-affected firms might show 
additional movement when actual proposals to change the tax laws are 
introduced in the legislative process. If these proposals are not in 
line with investors' previously formed tax-change expectations, there 
should be a readjustment of expectations with respect to the future 
cash flows of the firm. This rea~justment should be accompanied by a 
change in the price of a firm's stock. In fact, such a price change 
has been found in response to the news that a tax change was merely 
being considered [Madeo and Pincus, 1985]. To the extent that tax 
changes continue to be concerned with the same items (e.g., deprecia-
tion, investment tax credit, tax rates, etc.) proposals should continue 
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to have a greater impact on the·stock prices of tax-change-affected 
firms than non-affected firms. 
Third, the actual passage of legislation and the resulting reduc-
tion of uncertainty about the tax change may cause greater changes in 
the stock prices of tax-change-affected firms than in the prices of 
'• 
other firms. If investors are significantly uncertain about the final 
form of a tax act or the pro~ability that a tax act will become law, 
then passage of the tax act should reduce that uncertainty and change 
investor expectations with respect to the future cash flows of a firm. 
Such a change in investor expectations should cause a change in the 
price of the stock. Numerous studies have found a significant market 
reaction to the passage of new tax laws [Ayres, 1982; Schipper and 
Thompson, 1983; Madeo and Pincus, 1985]. 
Fourth, the stock prices of tax-change-affected firms might 
experience additional adjustments when the financial statements follow-
ing the change are disclosed and it becomes clearer what the actual 
impact of the change on the cash flows of the firm are. If the actual 
cash-flow impact of a change is different from the impact expected 
based on the law that was passed, the stock price should change. If 
the stock prices of tax-change-affected firms are affected at one or 
more of the four stages described, then the variance of the error terms 
in the market model will be greater for these firms than for non-
affected firms, all other things being equal. 
Tax changes can cause abrupt changes in the level of a firm's cash 
flows, which in turn should affect a firm's stock price, thereby 
causing returns to vary independently of the market returns. In fact, 
the relative magnitude of tax-change-induced changes in the levels of 
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cash flows has been shown to be associated with the relative magnitude 
of related stock price changes [Madeo and Pincus, 1985; Manegold and 
Karlinsky, 1988]. It is also possible that the tax changes may have 
simply made the cash flows of the firm more variable. Since additional 
variability of the firm's cash flows should increase the variability of 
the stock price, unsystematic risk may be affected via this relation-
ship. 
Total risk, as discussed in the literature review, is dependent on 
both systematic and unsystematic risk, and any of the factors that 
affect either systematic risk or unsystematic risk also may affect 
total risk. Thus, tax changes may affect total risk through their 
effect on systematic or unsystematic risk. Since the frequency and the 
variability of the tax-change-induced cash flow changes can affect 
unsystematic risk, they can also affect total risk. 
Although total risk is a function of unsystematic risk, the level 
of assurance (as measured by the p value) that there is a relationship 
between tax changes and unsystematic risk is not necessarily the same 
as the level of assurance that there is a relationship between tax 
changes and total risk. Total risk is a function of systematic risk 
and unsystematic risk. If there is strong evidence (as measured by the 
p value) of a relationship between tax changes and systematic risk, the 
evidence of a relationship between tax changes and total risk could 
also be strengthened. On the other hand, if the evidence of a rela-
tionship between tax changes and systematic risk is very weak, it could 
further weaken the evidence of a relationship between tax changes and 
total risk. The hypotheses to be tested should therefore indicate the 
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investigation of the relationships between tax changes and total risk 
as well as unsystematic risk. 
It is possible that unsystematic and total risk are related inde-
pendently to the frequency of these tax changes, regardless of the 
variability of the cash flow effects resulting from tax changes. 
Therefore, the following sub-hypotheses (stated in the null form) were 
tested: 
Hl.000 : The relative frequency of tax changes to firms is not 
related to the unsystematic risk of stocks. 
Hl.Ol0 : The relative frequency of tax changes to firms is not 
related to the total risk of stocks. 
On the other hand, it is also possible that the unsystematic and 
total risk of stocks are affected independently by the variability of 
the effects on firms' cash flows of tax changes, regardless of the 
frequency of the tax changes. Consistent with this possibility, the 
following sub-hypotheses (stated in the null form) were tested: 
Hl.l00 : The relative variability of tax-change-induced cash flow 
changes is not related to the unsystematic risk of stocks. 
Hl.ll0 : The relative variability of tax-change-induced cash flow 
changes is not related to the total risk of stocks. 
It is also possible that the unsystematic and total risk of stocks 
is affected jointly by the frequency and the variability of the effects 
of tax changes on a firm's cash flows. To investigate this possibili-
ty, the following sub-hypotheses (stated in the null form) were tested: 
Hl. 200 : The relative frequency and variability of tax-change-
induced cash flows to firms are not related to the 
unsystematic risk of stocks. 
Hl.210 : The relative frequency and variability of tax-change-
induced cash flows to firms are not related to the total risk 
of stocks. 
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If the null hypothesis of no significance were rejected, it would 
indicate that there is a relationship between the relative frequency 
and variability of the effects of tax changes on firms' cash flows and 
the unsystematic and total risk levels of individual companies. 
The previous sub-hypotheses concerning variability have focused on 
possible relationships between total or unsystematic risk and the 
variability of the cash flow changes c~used by tax changes. As indi-
cated in Chapter II, the unsystematic and total risk of a firm should 
also be affected by the overall variability of its total cash flows. 
By affecting the variability of a firm's cash flows, tax changes could 
also affect the total and unsystematic risk of a firm's stock. To 
investigate this possibility, the following null hypotheses were 
tested: 
H2.00 : The effects of tax~change-induced cash flow changes on the 
variability of firms' cash flows are not related to the unsys-
tematic risk of stocks. 
H2.10 : The effects of tax-change-induced cash flow changes on the 
variability of firm~' cash flows are not related to the total 
risk of stocks. 
The Effect of a Pattern of Tax Changes on 
Systematic Risk 
The theoretical support for a relationship between a history of 
frequent tax-change-induced cash flow changes and systematic risk is 
somewhat different than that discussed in the preceding section for 
unsystematic and total risk. A history of tax changes might affect the 
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variability of a firm's cash flows, but there is no direct relationship 
between variability in cash flows at the firm level and the systematic 
risk of the firm's stock [Bowman, 1979]. However, Bowman [1979] indi-
cates that there are numerous ways of showing a positive but indirect 
relationship between the variance of the firm's earnings and the 
systematic risk of the firm's stock,' 
Since firms' earnings changes and firms' cash flow changes are 
very highly correlated [Beaver and Dukes, 1972], there should also be a 
positive, although indirect, relationship between variance in the 
, ' 
firm's cash flows and the systematic risk of its stock. Thus, to the 
extent that a history·of frequent tax-change-induced cash flow changes 
has increased (decreased) the variance of a firm's cash flows relative 
to other firms, it should also have increased (decreased) the systemat-
ic risk of its stock. 
By affecting the overall variability of firms' cash flows, a 
history of tax changes could,be related to the systematic risk of 
stocks. To test for such a relationship, the following null hypothesis 
was tested: 
H3.00 : The effects of firms' tax-change-induced cash flow changes 
on the variability of firms' cash flows are not related to the 
systematic risk of stocks. 
As indicated in this section, it is possible that tax changes 
could affect total, systematic and unsystematic risk. Total and 
unsystematic risk might be affected by the frequency or variability of 
tax changes, as well as the effect of tax changes on cash flow vari-
ability. Systematic risk could also be affected if tax changes cause a 
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change in cash flow variability. The manner in which these relation-
ships were investigated is explained in the next section. 
Methodology 
A sample of firms was select~d and the cash flow effects of recent 
tax acts on these firms was modelled. Systematic, unsystematic, and 
total risk measures were computed for each of the sample firms. These 
measures were. each used as dependent variables ,in separate regression 
models. The ~ossible independent (explanatory) variables in the models 
were earnings variability, acco~nting beta, growth, financial leverage, 
size (measured as total assets), dividend payout ratio, market concen-
- ' ' 
tration, and the-property, plant and equipment to total assets ratio. 
The variables from the above group that were ultimately included 
in the final models were selected using a·stepwise regression proce-
dure. Outliers were then excluded, and the tax-change variables were 
added to the models. The effects of tax changes on the total, system-
atic, and unsystematic risk measures was then evaluated, based on the 
regression results. 
The Sample 
To choose a sample, a listing of the companies that were on the 
Compustat data base for every year from 1975 to 1988 was obtained. The 
fourteen-year period from 1975 through 1988 was used in this study for 
three reasons: (1) prior to 1975 there were relatively few "major" tax 
acts, so the 1975-88 perio~ encompasses years with a relatively higher 
concentration of tax changes, (2) more 10-K reports are generally 
available for this period, so the finer APB Opinion No. 11 - mandated 
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disclosures are obtainable for this period, and (3) it is possible that 
tax changes made before 1975 (there were no major tax acts from 1971 
through 1974) are now largely ignored by the investment community and 
are irrelevant to the investment decisions made today. 
A random sample of 110 firms was originally taken from this Compu-
stat list. As the data was collected for these firms, it became 
apparent that many of them would have to be dropped because of the 
unavailability of certain information necessary to estimate the effect 
of the tax changes in question. At a minimum, an amount for capital 
expenditures and a figure for the equipment/total property, plant and 
equipment ratio for the industry was necessary to estimate the cash 
flow effects of the changes in the rules for depreciation and ITC. See 
Appendix B for a further explanation of the calculation of the cash 
flow effects of the tax changes and ,the information necessary for those 
calculations. 
To ensure that the ~ample size would remain large enough to obtain 
reliable results, another random sample of 70 firms was chosen, for a 
total of 180 firms selected. However, twelve of the firms in the 
second sample were identical to,firms in the first sample, so the final 
sample contained 168 firms. ,A check of the CRSP monthly returns tape 
revealed that 41 of these 168 firms were not on the CRSP tape for every 
year of the period, so these firms were dropped from the sample. 
A total of 59 firms were dropped because of the unavailability of 
necessary information, as described in the previous paragraph. Of 
these 59 firms, 38 were either utilit~es (22) or financial service 
firms, that is, banks and insurance companies (16). Notwithstanding 
the limited information available for these utilities and financial 
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service firms, a good case could be made for excluding them from the 
sample anyway on the grounds that they are much more regulated than the 
other firms in the sample. The regulations they operate under might 
make their cash flows responsive to different variables from unregulat-
ed firms, and could, particularly in the case of utilities, make the 
cash flows more certain. In addition, the value of their common stock 
tends to be unusually dependent on the prevailing interest rate. 
The selection of the sample can be summarized as follows: 
Original random sample from Compustat 
Companies not on CRSP for all years 
Companies with inadequate information 
Utilities (22) 
Financial service companies (16) 
Others i1ll 





The distribution of the firms among the different industries, as 
represented by their SIC codes, is given in Table VI of Appendix D. No 
more than six sample firms came from any two-digit industry grouping, 
indicating that no particular industry dominates the the sample. 
Variables Used to Investigate 
Unsystematic and Total Risk 
The manner in which a history of frequent tax changes affects 
unsystematic risk is different from the manner in which a history of 
tax changes affects systematic risk. Thus, when unsystematic risk was 
being investigated it was necessary to use the estimates of the effects 
of tax changes on a firm's cash flows in a different manner from the 
way they were used when systematic risk was being investigated. The 
manner in which these estimates of the effects of tax changes on a 
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f~rm's cash flows was used to ~nvest~gate unsystemat~c r~sk w~ll be 
descr~bed f~rst 
For each f~rm ~n the sample, the cash-flow ~mpact of each tax 
change under cons~derat~on was est~mated for the f~rst three years for 
wh~ch the tax change was effect~ve The reason~ng beh~nd choos~ng 
three years was as follows Pred~ct~ons of the cash flow effects ~n 
future years of a current-year tax change should become more unrel~able 
as the length of t~me between the year be~ng pred~cted and the current 
year becomes longer It was felt that any pred~ct~on of the effect of 
a tax change on cash flows four years hence m~ght be so unrel~able as 
to be unusable by ~nvestors On the other hand, ~t was felt that a 
pred~ct~on one, two, or even three years ~nto the future should be 
rel~able enough to be of some use to ~nvestors 
The est~mates of the cash flow effects for these three years were 
totaled, g~v~ng a measure of the magn~tude of the cash flow effects of 
each tax change Th~s total could be shown as 
(6) 
where 
C1 J = the cash flow effect of the tax change on f~rm ~ ~n the Jth 
year follow~ng the tax change 
S~nce the absolute s~ze of the ~mpact of a tax change on a f~rm's 
cash flows could be expected to vary w~th the s~ze of the tax l~ab~l~-
ty, the tax change ~mpact was scaled to prov~de a measure of the rela-
t~ve ~mportance of the tax change to each f~rm The total market value 
of a f~rm's common stock has often been used as a scal~ng factor 
[Beaver, Kettler and Scholes, 1970] Th~s study also used the total 
market value of the f~rm's outstand~ng common stock as of the end of 
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the year of the tax change to scale the 1mpact of the tax changes on 
the f1rm's cash flows 
The est1mat1on process produced a ser1es of fract1ons for each 
In th1s ser1es, there 1s one fract1on for each year 1n the 
per1od be1ng stud1ed The numerator of each fract1on 1s the cash flow 
1mpact (the total effect on cash flows for the f1rst three years) of 
tax changes 1n the related year, or the TC1 J value Thus, for years 1n 
wh1ch there were no tax changes, the numerator, and also the result1ng 
fract1on, 1s zero The denom1nator of each fract1on 1s the total 
market value of the f1rm's outstand1ng common stock 1n that year 
Thus, 1f 
TCiJ = the cumulat1ve three-year cash flow effect of a tax change 




the market value of the common stock of f1rm 1 at the end of 
then the scaled cash flow effect of a tax change for f1rm 1 1n year J, 
denoted as T1 J, 1s 
(7) 
These T1 J values were then used to produce measures of the relat1ve 
frequency and var1ab1l1ty of the cash flow effects of tax changes 
undergone by each f1rm 
The effect of tax changes on the var1ab1l1ty of cash flows could 
be spec1f1ed by the use of a probab1l1ty d1str1but1on of the d1fferent 
poss1ble magn1tudes of tax-change-1nduced cash flow effects An 
1nvestor could use the moments of th1s d1str1but1on as 1nputs 1n the 
process of est1mat1ng the overall probab1l1ty d1str1but1on of cash 
flows to the f1rm However, a rel1able est1mat1on of a "tax-change" 
probab1l1ty d1str1but1on was not ava1lable 1n th1s case because of the 
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lun~ted number of "tax change" observat~ons Instead, th~s study used 
measures of the overall frequency and var~ability of the tax-change-
~nduced cash flow changes to ~nd~cate the effect of tax changes on the 
volat~l~ty of cash flows 
The variab~l~ty measure should ~nd~cate the relat~ve extent to 
wh~ch these cash flow changes are affect~ng overall cash flow volat~l~­
ty, wh~le the frequency measure should ~nd~cate the l~kel~hood of there 
be~ng a tax-change-~nduced cash flow change ~n any year Two measures 
that have been used as prox~es for the volat~l~ty of cash flow changes 
are (1) the~r var~ance [Rosenberg and Guy, 1976, Rosenberg and 
McK~bben, 1973], and (2) the~r standard dev~at~on [Ang, Peterson and 
Peterson, 1985, Gahlon and Gentry, 1982] 
S~nce the dependent var~ables that th~s var~ab~l~ty measure ~s 
be~ng related to, total r~sk (the var~ance of returns) and unsystemat~c 
r~sk (the var~ance of the error term ~n the market model), are both 
operat~onal~zed as var~ances, the var~ance appears to be a more appro-
pr~ate measure of var~ab~l~ty to use ~n th~s ~nstance than the standard 
dev~at~on For th~s reason, the var~ance of the T1J values was used ~n 
th~s study to measure the volat~l~ty of the tax-change-~nduced effects 
on f~rms' cash flows when the total r~sk or unsystemat~c r~sk are the 
dependent var~ables of ~nterest 
The frequency measure should ~n some way ~nd~cate the probab~l~ty 
of a tax change caus~ng a s~gn~f~cant cash flow effect ~n any g~ven 
year Any tax change that affected the perce~ved volat~l~ty of a 
stock's returns should be class~f~ed as s~gn~f~cant, and any change 
that d~d not affect the perce~ved volat~l~ty of a stock's returns 
should be class~f~ed as not s~gn~f~cant Unfortunately, no research 
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has been done to 1nd1cate what m1ght be "s1gn1f1cant" 1n th1s s1tuat1on 
and what m1ght be "1ns1gn1f1cant" In fact, "s1gn1f1cance" 1n the 
sense that 1t 1s descr1bed above, m1ght be d1fferent for each f1rm As 
a result, any formulat1on of the term "s1gn1f1cant" 1n th1s context 1s 
ad hoc 
Two poss1ble methods of def1n1ng s1gn1f1cance are (1) by refer-
ence to another var1able, such as net 1ncome, and (2) by rank1ng the 
data 1n quest1on w1th respect to magn1tude and class1fy1ng all those 
data 1tems that ranked above a certa1n percent1le to be s1gn1f1cant 
The f1rst method would def1ne s1gn1f1cance 1n terms of a percentage of 
a reference var1able, such as net 1ncome Unfortunately, as expla1ned 
1n the preced1ng paragraph, the use of any such percentage would be 
arb1trary 
In order to avo1d def1n1ng s1gn1f1cance 1n terms of some arb1trary 
percentage of a var1able such as net 1ncome, th1s study def1ned s1gn1f-
1cance us1ng the second method Wh1le st1ll arb1trary, at least 1t 
ut1l1zes the character1st1cs of the data at hand to determ1ne the 
cutoff po1nt Under th1s method, there are several poss1ble ways of 
choos1ng a percentile which will separate significance from 1ns1gn1f1-
cance One could use the mean or the med1an as the cutoff po1nt The 
d1str1but1on of the T1 J measures could also be 1nvest1gated, and the 
locat1on of any large group1ngs m1ght 1nd1cate where the cutoff po1nt 
should be located 
Another 1ssue wh1ch arose 1n connect1on w1th the calculat1on of 
the frequency measure was whether the total T1J value or only a port1on 
of each value should be used to determ1ne s1gn1f1cance In 11ght of 
the cont1nued frequency of tax changes 1n recent years, 1t 1s poss1ble 
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that the market has developed some long-run expectat1ons w1th respect 
to the probable magnitude and d1rect1on of the annual cash flow effect 
of future tax changes on 1nd1v1dual f1rms If th1s 1s the case, then 
the s1gn1f1cance of any tax-change-1nduced cash flow effect should be 
measured w1th reference to its dev1at1on from th1s "expected" cash flow 
effect s1nce the market w1ll already have 1mpounded th1s expected cash 
flow effect 1n 1ts est1mat1on of the value of the f1rm In recent 
years the effect of tax changes on the cash flows of a f1rm could 
probably best be descr1bed as random S1nce the expected value of a 
random var1able 1s the mean, th1s study used the mean of the T1 J values 
for each f1rm as an est1mate of the market's long-run expectat1ons w1th 
respect to the cash flow effects of future tax changes on that f1rm 
S1gn1f1cance was measured w1th respect to the dev1at1on of each TiJ 
value from the f1rm-spec1f1c mean T1 J value 
Cons1stent w1th the above d1scuss1on, the dev1at1ons from the 
f1rm-spec1f1c means were calculated as 
where 
(8) 
T1 J the three year cash flow effect on f1rm 1 of the tax change 
1n year J, standard1zed by the total market value of the 
f1rm's stock, and 
Tiavg = the average of all the TiJ' s for each f1rm 1 
The DIF1 J values for all f1rms were ranked 1n ascend1ng order of 
magn1tude The d1str1but1on of these DIF1 J values was 1nvest1gated to 
determ1ne 1f any large group1ngs suggested a cutoff po1nt There were 
no such group1ngs, so all of the DIF1 J values 1n the upper half of the 
rank1ng were def1ned to be "s1gn1f1cant" In th1s case, a s1gn1f1cant 
DIFiJ value was def1ned as any T1 J value whose dev1at1on from the f1rm--
spec1f1c mean was greater than the med1an dev1at1on for all fract1ons 
The frequency measure was def~ned to be the number of "s~gn~f~­
cant" fract~ons ~n a firm's ser~es of fract~ons, d~v~ded by the total 
number of years ~n the ser~es The measures for var~ab~l~ty and 
frequency were calculated for each sample f~rm for the fourteen-year 
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per~od from 1975 through 1988 The var~ab~l~ty and frequency measures, 
along w~th the term for the ~nteract~on between them, were then used to 
capture the relat~ve ~mpact of the frequency and var~ab~l~ty of tax-
change-~nduced cash flow changes on the total and unsystemat~c r~sk of 
these f~rms over the descr~bed per~ods Also calculated was the rat~o 
of the var~ance of a f~rm's actual cash flows to the var~ance of ~ts 
cash flows w~th the tax changes added back Th~s var~able, wh~ch ~s 
expla~ned ~n more deta~l below, was also used to ~nvest~gate the rela-
t~onsh~p between the tax changes and total and unsystemat~c r~sk 
Var~able Used to Invest~gate Systemat~c R~sk 
As ~nd~cated above, a h~story of tax changes could affect system-
at~c r~sk ~nd~rectly by caus~ng a change ~n the var~ab~l~ty of cash 
flows If the relat~onsh~p between tax changes and systemat~c r~sk ~s 
be~ng ~nvest~gated, ~t ~s therefore appropr~ate to measure the effect 
of tax changes on the overall var~ab~l~ty of cash flows If the 
relat~onsh~p between the measure of the effect of tax changes on the 
var~ab~l~ty of cash flows and systemat~c r~sk ~s s~gn~f~cant, ~t would 
~nd~cate that tax changes have had an effect on systemat~c r~sk 
In keep~ng w~th the above discuss~on, the var~able wh~ch was used 
when the relat~onsh~p of tax changes w~th systemat~c r~sk was be~ng 
~nvest~gated was the quot~ent produced by d~v~d~ng the var~ance of the 
actual cash flows for the per~od ~n quest~on by the var~ance of the 
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cash flows computed as 1f the tax changes had not been made (1 e , w1th 
cash flow effects of the tax changes added back) Th1s gave a measure 
of the var1ance of actual cash flows expressed as a percentage of the 
var1ance of cash flows w1thout tax changes 
then 
Thus, 1f 
u2A the var1ance of actual cash flows and 
u2w the var1ance of cash flows computed as 1f the tax changes had 
not been made, 
u2AJu2w = the appropr1ate 1ndependent var1able to use when system-
at1c r1sk was be1ng 1nvest1gated 
Th1s var1able (u2Afu2w) was symbol1zed by W/WO 
One poss1ble problem w1th the WfWO var1able was the effect of 
growth on 1ts est1mat1on A company w1th stable growth 1n cash flows 
over t1me w1ll show a pos1t1ve var1ance 1n 1ts cash flows, even though 
such a stable pattern may not affect the r1sk of the stock Th1s 1s 
because the var1ance 1s a measure of the dev1at1on of the 1nd1v1dual 
observat1ons from the mean observat1on, and constant growth w1ll cause 
such dev1at1ons To deal w1th the poss1ble effect of cash flow growth 
on the WfWO var1able, the follow1ng var1able was calculated 
(9) 
where 
ACF1 actual cash flows for year 1, 
CFW1 cash flows for year 1 w1th the effect of tax changes added 
back, and 
1 - the years from 1975 to 1988 
The term (ACF1 -ACF1 - 1 )/ACF1 - 1 1n the numerator of equatwn (9) 
g1ves the actual percentage cash flow growth 1n year 1 The comparable 
term from the denom1nator of equat1on (9) 1s (CFW1 -CFW1 - 1)/CFW1 - 1 Th1s 
term g1ves, for year 1, the percentage growth 1n cash flows w1th the 
cash flow effects of the tax changes added back The numerator of 
W/W00 1s the var1ance of the year-to-year percentage growth 1n actual 
cash flows, wh1le the denom1nator 1s the var1ance of the year-to-year 
percentage growth 1n cash flows w1th the effect of tax changes added 
back 
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The var1ance of the actual percentage growth 1n cash flows g1ves a 
measure of the d1spers1on of the 1nd1v1dual annual cash flow growth 
percentages about the average annual percentage cash flow growth for 
the company S1nce 1t 1s only a measure of d1spers1on about the mean, 
the var1ance measure 1s 1ndependent of the mean of the observat1ons 
It follows that the numerator of equat1on (9) 1s 1ndependent of the 
average annual percentage growth 1n actual cash flows By the same 
reason1ng, the denom1nator of equat1on (9) 1s 1ndependent of the 
average annual percentage growth of cash flows w1th the cash flow 
effects of the tax changes added back S1nce both the numerator and 
the denom1nator of equat1on (9) are 1ndependent of the average annual 
percentage growth of cash flows, the ent1re W/W00 var1able 1s 1ndepen-
dent of the average annual percentage growth of cash flows 
Cash flow amounts were e1ther (1) taken from the "cash flows from 
operat1ons" amount on the Statement of Changes 1n F1nanc1al Pos1t1on, 
1f ava1lable, or (2) computed as 1n Beaver and Dukes [1972] by add1ng 
back to earn1ngs deprec1at1on, deplet1on, amort1zat1on, and the changes 
1n the deferred tax account Th1s 1ndependent var1able was computed 
for the per1od from 1975 through 1988 
Est1mates of the federal 1ncome tax 1nformat1on needed to perform 
the analys1s were obta1ned pr1mar1ly from publ1shed f1nanc1al reports 
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Account1ng Pr1nc1ples Board Op1n1on No 11, Account1ng for Income Taxes 
(1967), requ1res that f1rms d1sclose (1) the t1m1ng d1fferences 1n-
volved 1n calculat1ng tax expense and (2) a reconc1l1at1on between the 
max1mum statutory rate (generally 46%) and the actual effect1ve rate of 
tax that the company pays These d1sclosures were used 1n th1s study 
to est1mate the actual 1mpact of a tax change on the tax l1ab1l1ty of a 
company 
The pr1mary sources of the d1sclosures used were the Compustat 
data base and the Secur1t1es and Exchange Comm1ss1on 10-K reports For 
a more deta1led explanat1on of the calculat1ons used to determ1ne the 
effect of tax changes on the tax l1ab1l1t1es of 1nd1v1dual f1rms, see 
Append1x B The stock return 1nformat1on necessary to compute the 
total, systemat1c and unsystemat1c r1sk measures were obta1ned from the 
Center for Research 1n Secur1ty Pr1ces (CRSP) data base 
The Model 
The f1rst four hypotheses, Hl 000 , Hl 010 , Hl 100 , and Hl 110 , 
requ1re test1ng of the s1gn1f1cance of the frequency or var1ab1l1ty 
measures 1ndependently, wh1le the f1fth and s1xth hypotheses, Hl 200 
and Hl 210 , requ1re test1ng of the s1gn1f1cance of the frequency and 
var1ab1l1ty measures and the1r 1nteract1on as a group The test1ng 
procedure was sl1ghtly d1fferent for each measure of r1sk (total, 
systemat1c and unsystemat1c) that 1s 1nvest1gated 
The full regress1on model used when test1ng the f1rst s1x hypothe-
ses (1n wh1ch total r1sk or unsystemat1c r1sk 1s the dependent var1a-




~1J = e~ther the var~ance of returns, or the var~ance of the error 
term from the market model, for the 60 months end~ng w~th December of 
1988, 
L1 = the f~nanc~al leverage rat~o (the average of the rat~o of 
the total sen~or debt d~v~ded by total assets for f~rm ~ over the f~ve 
years end~ng ~n 1988), or 
1988 
t=1984 




D1 = d~v~dend payout (the average of the rat~o of d~v~dends pa~d 
d~v~ded by ~ncome ava~lable for common stock for f~rm ~ over the f~ve 
years end~ng ~n 1988), or 
1988 
I (cash d~v~dends pa~d to common stockholders)t 
t=1984 
1988 
I (~ncome ava~lable for common stockholders)t 
t=1984 
(12) 
E1 = earn~ngs var~ab~l~ty (the standard dev~at~on of the rat~o of 
earn~ngs d~v~ded by the market value of all outstand~ng common stock 







I I 2 
-=..t__ - avg[-V-]) 
vt-1 
I 5 } 5 , (13) 
(~ncome ava~lable for common stockholders)t and 
(market value of common stock at f~scal year-endh- 1' 
1988 
< I ~t ) I s , 
t=1984 t- 1 
(14) 
Ck =market concentrat~on for ~ndustry k for the year 1988, (mea-
sured as each ~ndustry's four-f~rm concentrat~on rat~o, based on total 
sales), or 
total 1988 sales of the four f~rms ~n the sample 
company's ~ndustry w~th the h~ghest sales 
total 1988 sales of all f~rms ~n the sample 
company's ~ndustry 
A1 = asset s~ze (the natural logar~thm of the average of total 
assets for f~rm ~ over the f~ve years end~ng ~n 1988) 
1988 
I total assetst 
ln t=...:1:..:.9.:....84'---------
5 
F1 the frequency measure for each f~rm, or 
the number of "s~gn~f~cant" tax changes for 
the sample company ~n the per~od 
the number of years ~n the per~od (14) 






T1 t the cash flow effects of the tax change for the sample f~rm 




G1 a average asset growth for the 5 years end~ng ~n 1988 
G a 
1 
1988 (total assetsh - (total assetsh-1 
I 
t=1984 (total assetsh-1 
5 
(18) 
G1 c average growth of cash flows for the 5 years end~ng ~n 1988, 
1988 
(total cash flows)t - (total cash flows)t-1 
I 
t=1984 (total cash flows) t-1 
(19) 
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P1 = the average rat1o of property, plant and equ1pment to total 
assets for the 5 years end1ng 1n 1988, or 
1988 (total property, plant, and equ1pment)t 
I 




B1 = the account1ng beta (the covar1ance of the f1rm's earn1ngs 
w1th the earn1ngs of the market, d1v1ded by the var1ance of the mar-
ket's earn1ngs, for the ten-year per1od end1ng 1n 1988), or 
1988 

















(N = the number of f1rms for wh1ch 1ncome 
data were ava1lable on Compustat for 
year 1), and, 
=I ItM 
t=1979 
bm regress1on coeff1c1ents for the var1ables, and 
e1 an error term 




r1sk) and the use of a str1ctly l1near model was ver1f1ed by plott1ng 
the res1duals aga1nst each var1able and 1nspect1ng the plots None of 
the plots exh1b1ted a pattern cons1stent w1th that of a non-l1near 
var1able 
Three of the twelve 1ndependent var1ables 1n the above model are 
tax-change var1ables Of the rema1n1ng n1ne, e1ght were chosen for 
1nclus1on 1n the model because, as expla1ned 1n Chapter II, pr1or 
stud1es have 1nd1cated that they are related to r1sk [Beaver, Kettler 
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and Scholes, 1970, Logue and Merv1lle, 1972, Moyer and Chatf1eld, 1983, 
Rosenberg and McK1bben, 1973] The growth variable was computed as 
both growth 1n assets and growth 1n cash flows 
The n1nth 1ndependent var1able, Pi, was chosen for 1nclus1on 1n 
the model because many of the tax changes 1n recent years have affected 
1n some way the tax treatment of the property, plant, and equ1pment of 
the f1rm To ver1fy that the tax-change var1ables were not merely 
prox1es for the relat1ve amount of property, plant, and equ1pment the 
f1rm possessed, P1 was 1ncluded 1n the model 
Test1ng of Hl 000 through Hl 110 was begun by perform1ng a stepw1se 
regress1on tw1ce on the full model us1ng all of the observat1ons The 
stepw1se procedure has the advantage of prov1d1ng a pars1mon1ous 
explanatory model, wh1ch m1n1m1zes the potent1al for coll1near1ty among 
the var1ables One of the above two runs had total r1sk as the depen-
dent var1able and the other used unsystemat1c r1sk as the dependent 
var1able 
var1able) 
Th1s procedure produced two models (one for each dependent 
At th1s po1nt outl1ers were excluded us1ng the methods recommended 
by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980] Th1s 1nvolved the calculat1on of 
the effect of the om1ss1on of each observat1on on the coeff1c1ent of 
1nterest (1n th1s case, the coeff1c1ents of the tax change var1ables) 
The models used 1n th1s process 1ncluded the var1ables obta1ned from 
the stepw1se procedure above, plus the 1ndependent var1ables of pr1mary 
1nterest (the frequency and var1ab1l1ty measures) 
The process of exclud1ng outl1ers was postponed unt1l after the 
stepw1se procedure had selected a l1m1ted set of var1ables because of 
the h1gh poss1b1l1ty of coll1near1ty among the var1ables 1n the full 
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model Coll1near1ty between some of these var1ables and the measures 
of frequency and var1abil1ty could be a source of 1nstab1l1ty 1n the 
coeff1c1ents of the latter var1ables Us1ng the Belsley, Kuh and 
Welsch (1980) outl1er exclus1on techn1que, each observat1on that has an 
abnormally large effect on the coeffec1ent of 1nterest (1n th1s case, 
the coeff1c1ents for frequency and var1ab1l1ty of the tax change 
effects) 1s 1dent1f1ed and excluded from the sample S1nce the compu-
tat1on of the effects of the observat1on on the coeff1c1ent depends on 
the or1g1nal calculat1on of the coeff1c1ent, any 1nstab1l1ty 1n the 
coeff1c1ent could potent1ally cause the wrong observat1ons to be 
1dent1f1ed as outl1ers 
To 1llustrate the use of th1s outl1er exclus1on techn1que, assume 
the effect of only one var1able on another var1able 1s be1ng 1nvest1-
gated Suppose that plott1ng the observat1ons results 1n the plot 1n 
F1gure 1, where the dependent var1able (y) 1s plotted along the ver-
t1cle ax1s and the 1ndependent var1able (x) 1s plotted along the 
hor1zontal ax1s Two common means of 1dent1fy1ng outl1ers are (1) the 
exam1nat1on of the res1duals for each observat1on and (2) the exam1na-
t1on of the number of standard dev1at1ons each observat1on 1s from the 
mean of each var1able These are, accord1ng to Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 
[1980] 1nappropr1ate for use 1n the example g1ven 
Accord1ng to Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, the observat1on A, be1ng 
toward the end of the l1ne of observat1ons, would probably have a 
larger effect on the computed regress1on coeff1c1ent than would obser-
vat1on B, wh1ch 1s near the center Observat1on A 1s therefore more 
l1kely to be caus1ng error 1n the est1mat1on of the coeff1c1ent 
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+ 
larger than that of observat~on A, so ~nspect~on of the res~duals would 
erroneously make B a more l~kely cand~date for exclus~on as an outl~er 
than A S~m~larly, observat~on C would be a more l~kely cand~date for 
exclus~on than A based on the~r standard dev~at~ons from the mean, even 
though observat~on A w~ll have a greater effect on the computed coeff~­
C1ent 
The techn~que that Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch recommend for the 
exclus~on of outl~ers ~s as follows F1rst, for each observat1on the 
coeff~c~ent w~th the observat~on 1ncluded ~n the data set and the 
coeff1c1ent w1thout the observat~on 1n the data set are computed 
Second, the d1fference between these two coeff1c~ents ~s then computed 
and d~v~ded by the var~ance of the coeff~c~ent Th1rd, th~s measure ~s 
then compared to 2/(n) 5 , where n equals the number of observat~ons ~n 
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the data set Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch contend that any observat1on 
assoc1ated w1th a measure greater than 2/(n) 5 1s an "1nfluent1al 
observat1on", or outl1er, and has an unusually large effect on the 
coeff1c1ent 1n quest1on 
After 1dent1f1cat1on and exclus1on of the outl1ers as descr1bed 
above, 1ndependent tests of the s1gn1f1cance of the frequency and 
var1ab1l1ty measures were made by test1ng the s1gn1f1cance of the 
regress1on coeff1c1ents perta1n1ng to those var1ables Jo1nt tests of 
the overall s1gn1f1cance of the frequency, var1ab1l1ty, and 1nteract1on 
terms (Hl 000 and Hl 010 ) were made as follows After perform1ng two 
regress1ons us1ng the full model (one regress1on for each dependent 
var1able), the data were used to perform two regress1ons of a reduced 
model The reduced model was the full model less the var1ables for 
frequency, var1ab1l1ty, and 1nteract1on 
(25) 
An F test of the add1t1onal explanat1on of var1at1on by the full 
model over that expla1ned by the reduced model was then used to deter-
m1ne the J01nt s1gn1f1cance of the frequency and var1ab1l1ty measures 
on total and systemat1c r1sk 
F = 
where, 
SSE(R) - SSE(F) / 
(n-10) - (n-13) 
The F stat1st1c was computed as, 
SSE(F) 
(n-3) 
SSE(R) = the error sum of squares for the reduced model, 
SSE(F) = the error sum of squares for the full model, and 
n = the number of observat1ons 
(26) 
As 1nd1cated by H2 00 and H2 10 , 1t 1s poss1ble that the effects of 
tax changes on cash flow var1ab1l1ty m1ght affect the total or unsys-
temat1c r1sk of f1rms To test for th1s, a process s1m1lar to that 
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used to test the LndLvLdual sLgnLfLcance of the frequency and varLabLl-
Lty measures was used StepwLse regressLons were run and two models 
were formed The varLables avaLlable for entry Lnto these models were 
One model had total rLsk as Lts 
dependent varLable, and the other had unsystematLc rLsk as Lts depen-
dent varLable 
Four models were then formed from the two models arrLved at above 
The model Ln whLch the dependent varLable was total rLsk fLrst had the 
varLable W/W00 (descrLbed above) added to Lts lLst of Lndependent 
varLables to form one model Another model was formed Ln the same way 
by addLng W/WOa (descrLbed Ln the next chapter) Lnstead of W/W00 
W/WOc and W/W08 are varLables that compare cash flow varLance wLth the 
tax changes to cash flow varLance wLthout the tax changes The sepa-
rate addLtLon of these varLables resulted Ln two models Ln whLch total 
rLsk was the dependent varLable 
Two more models were formed from the model selected by the step-
wLse procedure Ln the case where the dependent varLable was unsystemat-
LC rLsk Once agaLn W/WOc was added to the Lndependent varLables 
selected by the stepwLse model to form one dLfferent model 
(Lnstead of W/W00 ) was then added to the lLst of Lndependent varLables 
Ln the stepwLse model to form yet another model ThLs produced two 
models Ln whLch the dependent varLable was unsystematLc rLsk UsLng 
all four models and the technLques recommended by Belsley, Kuh and 
Welsch [1980], outlLers were LdentLfLed and excluded The hypotheses 
were then tested by reference to the sLgnLfLcance of the coeffLcLents 
of the W/W00 and W/WOa varLables 
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To test H3 00 , a stepw1se regress1on was f1rst run and two models 
were formed 1n wh1ch the 1ndependent var1ables were the var1ables that 
were selected by the stepw1se regress1on, plus e1ther the W/W00 or W/WOa 
var1able Outl1ers were once aga1n 1dent1f1ed and excluded us1ng the 
techn1ques recommended by Belsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980] The hypothe-
s1s was then tested by reference to the s1gn1f1cance of the coeff1-
c1ents of the W/W00 and WfWOa var1ables 
In summary, Hl 200 and Hl 210 were tested by test1ng the s1gn1f1-
cance of the frequency and var1ab1l1ty measures, and the1r 1nteract1on, 
J01ntly Hypotheses Hl 000 through Hl 110 were tested by perform1ng 
1ndependent s1gn1f1cance tests of the frequency and var1ab1l1ty mea-
sures, respect1vely Hypotheses H2 00 , H2 10 , and H3 00 were tested by 
test1ng the s1gn1f1cance of the W/W00 and W/WOa var1ables 1n models w1th 
the appropr1ate dependent var1ables 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
After the var1ables had been est1mated, one of the f1rst steps 
taken was the runn1ng of a correlat1on analys1s on all of the var1ables 
concerned w1th the study In th1s analys1s, a s1gn1f1cant (p value 
005 or less) but negat1ve relat1onsh1p was found between the W/WO 
var1able and all three measures of r1sk Subsequent regress1ons also 
produced s1gn1f1cant negat1ve (a = 012 or less) coeff1c1ents for the 
W/WO var1able when total or unsystemat1c r1sk was the dependent var1-
able S1nce a pos1t1ve relat1onsh1p w1th all of the measures of r1sk 
was expected, an 1nvest1gat1on of the poss1ble causes of th1s anomaly 
was made 
As d1scussed 1n the prev1ous chapter, 1t was poss1ble that growth 
could affect the relat1onsh1p between the W/WO var1able and the r1sk 
measures Th1s poss1b1l1ty was the reason for the transformat1on of 
the w;wo var1able to w;woc Bes1des growth, 1t also appeared that the 
asset s1ze var1able could adversely affect the relat1onsh1p between 
W/WO and the measures of r1sk Asset s1ze was pos1t1vely correlated 
w1th WjWO and negat1vely correlated w1th r1sk, so coll1near1ty between 
asset s1ze and W/WO could account for the negat1ve s1gn of the coeff1-
c1ent of W/WO To test for th1s, another var1able, W/WOa, was calcu-





ACF1 = actual cash flows for year L, 
A1 - 1 = total assets for year L-1, 
CFW1 = cash flows for year L wLth the effect of tax changes added back 
By focusLng on the year-to-year change Ln cash flows, thLs varL-
able captures a measure of the relatLve varLances (exclusLve of growth) 
of the asset-sLze-adJusted cash flows wLth and wLthout the effects of 
the tax changes W/WOa was thus added to the models used Ln thLs 
LnvestLgatLon 
After calculatLon of W/WOa, the basLc steps Ln the LnvestLgatLon 
were as follows 
(1) Three stepwLse regressLons were run, one for each Lndependent 
varLable, or rLsk measure The varLables avaLlable for selectLon 
by the stepwLse procedure were leverage (L), dLvLdend payout (D), 
earnLngs varLance (E), Lndustry concentratLon (C), asset sLze (A), 
average asset growth (G1a), average cash flow growth (G1 c), the 
ratLo of property, plant and equLpment to total assets (P), and 
accountLng beta (B) The varLables selected by the stepwLse 
procedure are gLven Ln Table I 
(2) UsLng the varLables selected by the stepwLse procedure and the 
tax-change varLables of Lnterest, models to be used to LdentLfy 
and exclude outlLers were formed The outlLers excluded for each 
model are LdentLfLed Ln Table VII of AppendLx D 
(3) After the outlLers have been excluded, the resultLng data sets and 
the models formulated Ln the precedLng step were used to perform 
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the necessary regressLons The varLables used Ln each regressLon, 
the assocLated coeffLcLents and the assocLated p values are gLven 
Ln Tables II through IV CollLnearLty dLagnostLcs for these 
models were LnvestLgated and no problems WLth collLnearLty were 
dLscovered CollLnearLty dLagnostLcs and a dLscussLon of them are 
contaLned Ln AppendLx E 
(4) The null hypotheses were accepted or reJected based on the sLgnLf-
Lcance of the coeffLcLents of the varLables of Lnterest 
TABLE I 






INDEPENDENT VARIABLES SELECTED 
(In the order selected by the procedure) 
L, E, C, A, G1 a, and B 
G1 a, P, Gic• and E 
L, E, A, B, and C 
The coeffLcLents and assocLated p values of the varLables Ln the 
four regressLons Ln whLch total rLsk was the dependent varLable are 
gLven Ln Table II A dLfferent tax-change varLable was Lncluded Ln 
each of the four regressLons Lncluded Ln Table II The p value of 
0 8974 for the coeffLcLent of the tax-change frequency varLable (F) Ln 
RegressLon 1 dLd not provLde any evLdence that thLs varLable was 
related to the dependent varLable, total rLsk RegressLon 2 lLkewLse 
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prov1ded no ev1dence of a relat1onsh1p between the tax-change var1ance 
measure (V) and total r1sk Although the coeff1c1ent of the tax-change 
var1ance measure was pos1t1ve 1n Regress1on 2, as expected, the p value 
of the tax-change var1ance measure (0 4570) d1d not 1nd1cate that a 
relat1onsh1p between that var1able and total r1sk ex1sts 
A J01nt test of the s1gn1f1cance of the frequency (F) and var1-
ab1l1ty (V) terms, along w1th the1r 1nteract1on term (F*V), was per-
formed As descr1bed 1n the prev1ous chapter, th1s 1nvolved us1ng an F 
test to compare the var1ance 1n total r1sk left unexpla1ned by a 
reduced model (one not conta1n1ng F, V, or F*V) w1th the var1ance left 
unexpla1ned by a full model (one conta1n1ng F, V, and F*V) The p 
value for th1s test was 0 9601, wh1ch does not support the hypothes1s 
of a J01nt relat1onsh1p between F, V, F*V, and the dependent var1able 
total r1sk 
The ev1dence prov1ded by regress1ons 3 and 4 1nd1cate that there 
1s a s1gn1f1cant relat1onsh1p between the total r1sk of a f1rm's stock 
and the effect of tax changes on the var1ab1l1ty of the year to year 
growth 1n cash flows of the f1rm As expla1ned prev1ously, W/WOa 1s 
the measure of the effect of the tax changes on the variance of cash 
flows, adJusted for asset s1ze and cash flow growth The s1gn of the 
coeff1c1ent of th1s var1able 1s pos1t1ve, as expected, and the p value 
of 0 0809 g1ves weak support to the hypothes1s that there 1s a rela-
t1onsh1p between total r1sk and the W/W08 var1able Regress1on 4 
prov1des much stronger ev1dence that there 1s a relat1onsh1p between 
total r1sk and the effect of tax changes on the var1ance of cash flows, 
adJusted only for growth (W/WOc) The coeff1c1ent of the W/WOc 
TABLE II 
REGRESSION RESULTS RISK MEASURE (DEPENDENT 
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var~able was pos~t~ve, as expected, and the correspond~ng p value was 
0 0107 
The results of the regress~ons ~n wh~ch the dependent var~able was 
unsystemat~c r~sk are g~ven ~n Table III For each regress~on (5 
through 8) a d~fferent tax-change var~able was ~ncluded as an ~ndepen-
dent var~able As the results for Regress~on 5 ~nd~cate, the coeff~-
c~ent of the tax-change frequency var~able (F) was once aga~n not 
s~gn~f~cant The ev~dence from th~s study therefore does not support 
the hypothes~s that there ~s a relat~onsh~p between the frequency of 
tax changes and unsystemat~c r~sk The coeff~c~ent for the measure of 
tax-change var~ance (V) ~n Regress~on 6 was pos~t~ve, as expected 
However, the p value for the coeff~c~ent of V ~n Regress~on 6 (0 3154) 
does not prov~de any ev~dence ~n support of the hypothes~s that the 
var~ance of the tax-change measure ~s related to unsystemat~c r~sk 
The add~t~onal explanatory power of the F, V, and F*V var~ables on 
unsystemat~c r~sk was also tested us~ng full and reduced models as 
descr~bed ~n the prev~ous chapter, and found to be ~ns~gn~f~cant (p 
value = 0 8927) 
Regress~ons 7 and 8 ~ncluded the var~ables (W/WOa and W/WOc) that 
measure the effect of the tax changes on the var~ance of cash flows 
The p value of the W/WOa coeff~c~ent ~n Regress~on 7 was 0 8136, so no 
ev~dence of a relat~onsh~p between th~s var~able and unsystemat~c r~sk 
was found ~n th~s study In Regress~on 8, the coeff~c~ent of the W/W00 
var~able had a correspond~ng p value of 0 0062 The s~gn of th~s 
coeff~c~ent was, as expected, pos~t~ve These results are strong 
ev~dence that when tax changes ~ncrease (decrease) the var~ance of the 
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TABLE III 
REGRESSION RESULTS RISK MEASURE (DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE) = UNSYSTEMATIC RISK 
Regress~on 5 6 7 8 
Nwnber 
N 63 66 65 66 
R-square 0 7621 0 7220 0 6979 0 7469 
(0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** 
Independent Var~able Coeff~c~ents (p values are below the coeff~-
Var~ables c~ents ~n parentheses) 
L 0 01726 0 02396 0 02228 0 02232 
(0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)* ~ 
E 0 03852 0 01056 0 00961 0 01119 
(0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 OOOl)*k 
c -0 00965 -0 01173 -0 01169 -0 01414 
(0 0205)* (0 0242)* (0 0319)* (0 0027)** 
A -0 00179 -0 00308 -0 00332 -0 00313 
(0 0002)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** (0 0001)** 
B 0 00011 0 00051 0 00038 0 00052 
(0 5016) (0 0027)** (0 0003)** (0 0012)** 
F -0 00010 
(0 7811) 
v 0 28937 
(0 3154) 
W/W08 -0 00288 
(0 8136) 
W/W00 0 00288 
(0 0062)** 
INTERCEPT 0 01752 0 02621 0 03138 0 02705 
(0 0020)* (0 0001)** (0 0179)* (0 0001)** 
* ~nd~cates s~gn~f~cance at the 5 percent level 
** ~nd~cates s~gn~f~cance at the 1 percent level 
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growth 1n cash flows, the level of unsystemat1c r1sk 1s also 1ncreased 
(decreased) 
Table IV conta1ns the results of the regress1ons (9 and 10) 1n 
wh1ch systemat1c r1sk was the dependent var1able It was hypothes1zed 
TABLE IV 
REGRESSION RESULTS RISK MEASURE (DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE) = SYSTEMATIC RISK 
Regress1on 9 10 
Number 
N 66 65 
R-square 0 4075 0 4278 
(0 0001)** (0 0001)** 
Independent Var1able Coeff1c1ents (p 
Var1ables values are below the coeff1-
c1ents 1n parentheses) 
E 0 09534 0 15006 
(0 0677) (0 2041) 
Ga 1 19919 1 34950 
(0 0006)** (0 0002)** 
Gc 0 15213 0 23904 
(0 0182)* (0 0018)** 
p -0 80695 -0 77031 
(0 0005)** (0 0006)** 
w;woa -0 35098 
(0 6301) 
W/WOc -0 11396 
(0 1383) 
INTERCEPT 1 61385 1 29605 
(0 0342)* (0 0001)** 
* 1nd1cates s1gn1f1cance at 5 % level 
** 1nd1cates s1gn1f1cance at 1 % level 
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that as tax changes 1ncreased (decreased) the var1ance of cash flows, 
systemat1c r1sk should be 1ncreased (decreased) The results of 
Regress1ons 9 and 10 do not support th1s hypothes1s The p value of 
the coeff1c1ent of the W/W08 var1able was 0 6301, 1nd1cat1ng no support 
for the hypothes1s The coeff1c1ent of the W/W00 var1able had a corre-
spond1ng p value of 0 1383, wh1ch prov1ded no 1nd1cat1on of a relat1on-
sh1p between W/W00 and systemat1c r1sk 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Overv1ew 
The frequency of the passage of new tax leg1slat1on 1n recent 
years has ra1sed the poss1b1l1ty that the r1sk of f1rms most affected 
by these changes m1ght have been affected The purpose of th1s study 
was to attempt to determ1ne 1f there 1s a relat1onsh1p between (1) 
total and unsystemat1c r1sk and the frequency and/or the var1ab1l1ty of 
the cash flow effects of these tax changes, and (2) total, unsystemat-
1c, and systemat1c r1sk and the effect of these tax changes on the 
var1ab1l1ty of cash flows 
An 1nvestor who 1s not r1sk-neutral w1ll want to adjust the stocks 
1n h1sjher portfol1os on the bas1s of the1r expected r1sk and return so 
that the expected r1sk and return of h1sjher ent1re portfol1o max1m1zes 
the expected ut1l1ty of the 1nvestor A relat1onsh1p between a h1story 
of tax changes and systemat1c r1sk would always be 1mportant to such an 
1nvestor, s1nce systemat1c r1sk cannot be d1vers1f1ed away For the 
1nvestor who 1s not fully d1vers1f1ed, a relat1onsh1p between unsystem-
at1c r1sk and a h1story of tax changes would also be 1mportant, s1nce 
unsystemat1c r1sk affects the total r1sk of a portfol1o wh1ch 1s not 
fully d1vers1f1ed In fact, as expla1ned 1n Chapter II, fully d1vers1-
f1ed portfol1os do not perform as well as Markow1tz-Sharpe eff1c1ent 
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portfol1os, at least 20-25% of whose total r1sk 1s composed of unsys-
temat1c r1sk 
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Compan1es were selected and est1mates of the cash-flow effects of 
some recent tax acts on these compan1es were computed These cash-flow 
effects were then used to calculate var1ables relat1ng to (1) the 
frequency and var1ab1l1ty of the cash-flow effects and (2) the 1mpact 
of the cash-flow effects on the overall var1ab1l1ty of cash flows In 
add1t1on, var1ables for leverage, d1v1dend payout, earn1ngs var1ab1l1-
ty, market concentrat1on, asset s1ze, growth, account1ng beta, and 
property, plant and equ1pment as a percent of total assets were also 
computed 
The stepw1se regress1on procedure was used to select the var1ables 
to be 1ncluded 1n the ult1mate regress1on models, and outl1ers were 
then 1dent1f1ed and excluded The appropr1ate tax-change var1ables 
were then added to the models arr1ved at us1ng the stepw1se procedure, 
and a f1nal regress1on analys1s was performed us1ng the outl1er-exclud-
ed data sets In general, the hypotheses were then tested by 1nspect-
1ng the p values assoc1ated w1th the tax-change var1ables 
As the results 1n Table IV 1nd1cate, th1s study found no ev1dence 
1nd1cat1ng that there 1s a l1nk between tax changes and systemat1c 
Th1s study, therefore, does not support the propos1t1on that 
1nvestors attempt1ng to est1mate systemat1c r1sk should be concerned 
about the effects of tax changes There are several poss1ble method-
olog1cal shortcom1ngs that m1ght have resulted 1n the lack of s1gn1f1-
cant f1nd1ngs 1n th1s area As expla1ned 1n Chapter III, an 1nd1rect 
l1nk between systemat1c r1sk and cash flow var1ab1l1ty (and thus tax 
changes) was establ1shed, but a d1rect l1nk could not be found It 
70 
m1ght be that the effects of th1s 1nd1rect l1nk were not strong enough 
to be 1dent1f1ed us1ng the stat1st1cal techn1ques that were employed 1n 
th1s study 
The cash-flow effects were of necess1ty est1mated us1ng the only 
1nformat1on that was ava1lable, that 1s, f1nanc1al statement 1nforma-
t1on It may be that these est1mates were not accurate enough for the 
ant1c1pated effects to be detected by the stat1st1cal techn1ques 
employed 1n th1s study There 1s also no agreement 1n the l1terature 
as to the t1me per1od, 1f any ex1sts, over wh1ch the measurement of 
systemat1c r1sk (beta) best spec1f1es the "true" systemat1c r1sk The 
poss1b1l1ty therefore ex1sts that systemat1c r1sk, as measured 1n th1s 
study, was m1sspec1f1ed 
Th1s study also found no ev1dence 1nd1cat1ng a l1nk between the 
frequency of tax changes and/or the var1ab1l1ty of the tax-1nduced 
changes 1n cash flows and total or unsystemat1c r1sk Aga1n, the 
process of est1mat1ng these var1ables m1ght have 1ntroduced measurement 
errors that obscured the true effects of the tax changes For 1n-
stance, est1mat1on of the frequency var1able 1nvolved an ad hoc deter-
m1nat1on of the po1nt that separated "s1gn1f1cant" tax change effects 
from those that were deemed to be 1ns1gn1f1cant As expla1ned above, 
the calculated cash-flow effects of the tax changes were est1mates 
based pr1mar1ly on 1nformat1on conta1ned 1n the f1nanc1al statements, 
so these est1mates m1ght have also contr1buted to any measurement error 
conta1ned 1n the frequency and var1ab1l1ty measures 
The results do 1nd1cate that there 1s a relat1onsh1p between the 
effect of past tax changes on the var1ance of cash flows and both 
unsystemat1c and total r1sk Spec1f1cally, 1t was found that the 
effect of recent tax changes on the var1ance of cash flows (after 
adjust1ng for the effects of growth on the var1ance) was related to 
both unsystemat1c and total r1sk Th1s research therefore prov1des 
support for the cons1derat1on of the effects of tax changes when 
unsystemat1c or total r1sk 1s be1ng est1mated 
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S1nce no relat1onsh1p between tax changes and systemat1c r1sk was 
found, the relat1onsh1p w1th total r1sk apparently 1s caused by the 
relat1onsh1p w1th unsystemat1c r1sk (systemat1c r1sk and unsystemat1c 
r1sk be1ng the determ1nants of total r1sk) The 1mpl1cat1on of the 
f1nd1ng of a relat1onsh1p 1s that 1nvestors who are concerned w1th the 
level of unsystemat1c r1sk 1n the1r portfol1os (that 1s, 1nvestors w1th 
portfol1os that are not fully d1vers1f1ed) m1ght want to take 1nto 
account the extent to wh1ch the stocks they are cons1der1ng have been 
affected by tax changes 1n the past, as well as how they m1ght be 
affected by tax changes 1n the future 
Past tax changes m1ght have had some effect on the unsystemat1c 
r1sk of a part1cular stock If an 1nvestor 1s bas1ng an est1mate of 
future unsystemat1c r1sk on a measure of past unsystemat1c r1sk, 1t 
m1ght be appropr1ate to factor out the effect of past tax changes on 
past unsystemat1c r1sk when est1mat1ng future systemat1c r1sk When 
est1mat1ng future unsystemat1c r1sk, the 1nvestor m1ght also want to 
cons1der the poss1ble effect future tax changes m1ght have 
Furthermore, g1ven the apparent relat1onsh1p between tax changes 
and total and unsystemat1c r1sk, 1t 1s poss1ble that 1nvestors, try1ng 
to reduce the r1sk of the1r portfol1o, have 1nvested 1n f1rms not 
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subJect to th1s "tax-change" r1sk It 1s not necessary that 1nvestors 
be aware of the source of the r1sk All that 1s needed 1s for the 
measured r1sk of the tax-change-effected f1rms to be h1gher than that 
of other f1rms If th1s sh1ft 1n 1nvest1ng behav1or has happened, then 
the effect of recent tax changes on the var1ab1l1ty of a f1rms cash 
flows m1ght have 1nadvertently affected the d1str1but1on of resources 
1n the market Th1s 1s 1mportant because, as stated by Manegold and 
Karl1nsky [1988), pol1cy makers need to be aware of the red1str1but1ve 
effects of tax law changes 
If pol1cy makers do not want to cause red1str1but1ve effects by 
1ncreas1ng the r1sk of some f1rms more than others, then pol1cy makers 
m1ght cons1der mak1ng less drast1c changes to the tax laws By so 
do1ng, they m1ght be able to m1n1m1ze the effect of the tax changes on 
the var1ab1l1ty of the cash flows of f1rms, and thus on the total and 
unsystemat1c r1sk of f1rms 
L1m1tat1ons and Suggest1ons for 
Future Research 
Th1s study 1s subJect to several l1m1tat1ons Because the sample 
s1ze 1s relat1vely small, the results m1ght not be general1zable to the 
larger populat1on of stocks traded on the var1ous exchanges Random-
1zat1on dur1ng the sample select1on process should have helped to 
offset the poss1ble effects of hav1ng a relat1vely small sample, 
however Some groups of f1rms, such as banks and ut1l1t1es, have been 
of necess1ty excluded from the sample The f1nd1ngs should not be 
general1zed to these groups of f1rms w1thout further research 
A further l1m1tat1on 1s that the uses of the tax-change 1nforma-
t1on that are 1mpl1ed by the f1nd1ngs m1ght not be pract1cal from a 
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costjbenef1t perspect1ve The computat1on of the tax-change cash flow 
effects was a t1me-consum1ng process The costs of comput1ng these 
effects m1ght be greater than the benef1ts of the add1t1onal 1nforma-
t1on concern1ng unsystemat1c r1sk that can be had through knowledge of 
these effects 
Several extens1ons of th1s research are poss1ble An exper1mental 
market study 1n wh1ch the effects of a ser1es of s1mulated tax changes 
over t1me are 1nvest1gated can be performed Perhaps 1n a more con-
trolled sett1ng the expected relat1onsh1p between tax changes and 
systemat1c r1sk can be detected The costs and benef1ts of us1ng th1s 
tax-change 1nformat1on 1n 1nvest1ng dec1s1ons can be exam1ned further 
As stated before, 1f the costs of obta1n1ng th1s 1nformat1on outwe1gh 
the benef1ts of hav1ng 1t, the f1nd1ngs could be useless from an 
1nvest1ng perspect1ve F1nally, research can be done on the probable 
red1str1but1ve effects of the add1t1onal unsystemat1c r1sk caused by 
these tax changes In other words, a study can address the 1ssue of 
how much red1str1but1on of resources 1n the economy has been caused by 
the tax-change-1nduced changes 1n unsystemat1c r1sk 
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RECENT MAJOR TAX ACTS 
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Below 1s a l1st1ng of the maJor tax acts s1nce 1968 and the1r more 
1mportant corporate tax prov1s1ons 
Tax Reform Act of 1969 
* The 1nvestment tax cred1t was repealed 
* The 10% m1n1murn tax was enacted 
* Percentage deplet1on reduced from 27 5 to 22 percent 
Revenue Act of 1971 
* The 1nvestment tax cred1t was reenacted 
* Tax deferral prov1ded for the export 1ncome of domest1c 1nterna 
t1onal sales corporat1ons (DISC's) 
Tax Reduct1on Act of 1975 
* Increased ITC percentage from 7% to 10% 
* Increased the corporate surtax exempt1on from $25,000 to 
$50,000 
* Extended the net operat1ng loss carryback per1od 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 
* Reduct1ons 1n the rates of the lower corporate tax brackets 
* Extens1on of the 1nvestment tax cred1t 
* Longer carryover of net operat1ng losses (from f1ve to two 
years) 
* L1m1tat1on on use of net operat1ng losses 1n acqu1s1t1ons of 
loss corporat1ons 
* Extens1on of the amort1zat1on per1od for construct1on 1nterest 
and taxes 
The Econom1c Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
* Accelerat1on of deprec1at1on deduct1ons through 1ntroduct1on of 
the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) 
* Introduct1on of a 25% cred1t for 1ncremental research and 
development expend1tures 
* Introduct1on of "safe harbor" leas1ng prov1s1ons 
* Adopt1on of expanded cred1ts for rehab1l1tated bu1ld1ngs 
* Increase 1n 1nvestment tax cred1ts for 3 and 5 year recovery 
property 
The Tax Egu1ty and F1scal Respons1b1l1ty Act of 1982 
* Bas1s reduct1on for 1nvestment tax cred1t 
* Reduct1on 1n percent of tax l1ab1l1ty to be offset by 1nvestment 
tax cred1t 
* Interest attr1butable to or1g1nal 1ssue d1scount must be 
recogn1zed on a present value bas1s 
* The benef1ts of safe-harbor leas1ng were scaled back 
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 
* Extens1on of the recovery per1od for real property 
* Deprec1at1on recapture on 1nstallment sales accelerated 
* Reduct1on 1n the benef1ts of the 85% d1v1dends-rece1ved deduc-
t1on for corporat1ons 
* Reduct1on 1n the benef1ts of ACRS deprec1at1on and the 1nvest-
ment tax cred1.t for "luxury" automob1.les and "personal use" 
1.tems 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
* Corporate tax rates decreased 
* General Ut1.l1.t1.es doctr1.ne repealed 
* Investment tax cred1.t repealed 
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Because each tax act that has been enacted over the per1od 1n 
quest1on has been un1que, 1t was necessary to determ1ne the tax l1ab1l-
1ty effects of each tax act separately Th1s sect1on w1ll spec1fy the 
manner 1n wh1ch the tax l1ab1l1ty effects of each general type of tax 
change on each company was est1mated In general, the effects of each 
change was measured only for the year of change and the follow1ng two 
years, for a total of three years 
Corporate M1n1mum Tax 
For 1976 and later years the m1n1mum tax rate was 1ncreased from 
10% to 15% An approx1mat1on of the tax effect of th1s change was 
obta1ned from the 1nformat1on prov1ded 1n the reconc1l1at1on between 
the statutory tax rate and the corporat1on's effect1ve tax rate Th1s 
reconc1l1at1on expresses the m1n1mum tax 1n terms of a percentage of 
1ncome before 1ncome taxes The product of th1s percentage and 1ncome 
before 1ncome taxes was treated as the amount of the m1n1mum tax The 
tax effect of th1s change was then measured by mult1ply1ng one-th1rd by 
the total m1n1mum tax, as calculated above For 1986 and later years 
the corporate m1n1mum tax rate was ra1sed to 20% from 15% The total 
amount of the m1n1mum tax was calculated as above, and the add1t1onal 
tax caused by the tax change was then found by mult1ply1ng the total 
m1n1mum tax by one-fourth 
Deprec1at1on 
S1nce 1980 there have been several changes to the deprec1at1on 
rate structure In order to calculate the cash-flow effects of changes 
1n the rates of deprec1at1on 1t was necessary to have an est1mate of 
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what the deprec1at1on on assets be1ng purchased would have been under 
the old deprec1at1on system Unfortunately, f1nanc1al d1sclosures 
rarely conta1n the useful l1ves of the assets of the f1rm, and they do 
not typ1cally break assets, deprec1at1on, or accumulated deprec1at1on 
down 1nto real and personal property categor1es 
Useful l1ves and the amounts of real versus personal property 
purchased were est1mated 1n one of two ways When ava1lable, the 
deprec1at1on schedules 1n the 10-K report were used for th1s purpose 
In these schedules asset purchases are usually class1f1ed as e1ther 
real or personal, and the useful l1ves of the assets were approx1mated 
by d1v1d1ng deprec1at1on expense 1nto the total amount of assets 1n 
each category 
Where these deprec1at1on schedules were not ava1lable, 1nformat1on 
about cap1tal expend1tures for the 1ndustry to wh1ch the f1rm belongs 
was obta1ned from the 1982 Census of Manufactures [U S Department of 
Commerce (1982)] for manufactur1ng f1rms, the 1982 Census of Wholesale 
Trade [U S Department of Commerce (1982)] for wholesale f1rms, the 
1982 Census of Reta1l Trade [U S Department of Commerce (1982)] for 
reta1l f1rms, and the 1982 Census of Serv1ce Industr1es [U S Depart-
ment of Commerce (1982)] for serv1ce f1rms These sources class1fy the 
cap1tal expend1tures 1n an 1ndustry as e1ther real or personal proper-
ty Deprec1at1on 1s also categor1zed as perta1n1ng to e1ther real or 
personal property The useful l1ves of these assets was est1mated by 
d1v1d1ng the a~ount of real or personal property ut1l1zed 1n the 
1ndustry by the amount of real or personal property deprec1at1on, 
respect1vely Th1s 1s s1m1lar to the method employed by Swenson 
[1987] The amount of real or personal property purchased by the f1rm 
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was calculated by mult1ply1ng the f1rm's purchases of plant and equ1p-
ment (from the Statement of Changes 1n F1nanc1al Pos1t1on) by the 
respect1ve 1ndustry rat1os of real property expend1tures to total 
cap1tal outlays and personal property expend1tures to total cap1tal 
outlays 
For the 1981 change to ACRS, the "no-change" deprec1at1on was 
calculated us1ng the useful l1ves and property class1f1cat1ons est1mat-
ed above and assum1ng 150% decl1n1ng balance deprec1at1on The depre-
c1at1on after the change was est1mated by us1ng the 5-year property 
rates for personal property and the 15-year rates for real property 
The effect of the changes 1n deprec1at1on rates for real property after 
1981 were measured by mult1ply1ng the change 1n rates by the amounts of 
outlays for real and personal property, calculated as expla1ned above 
Investment Tax Cred1t 
The 1nvestment tax cred1t (ITC) was enacted 1n 1962, and repealed 
temporar1ly from October 10, 1966 unt1l March 10, 1967 and from Apr1l 
18, 1969 unt1l August 16, 1971 The ITC rate was 1ncreased from 7% to 
10% 1n 1975, and the ITC was eventually repealed 1n the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 For compan1es us1ng the flow-through method of account1ng for 
ITC, 1ts 1mpact on cash flow 1s best approx1mated w1th the use of the 
reconc1l1at1on between the statutory tax rate and the corporat1on's 
effect1ve tax rate Th1s reconc1l1at1on generally expresses ITC 1n 
terms of a percentage of 1ncome before 1ncome taxes Th1s percentage 
can be mult1pl1ed by 1ncome before 1ncome taxes, and the product w1ll 
be the amount of the ITC A more conven1ent method of obta1n1ng th1s 
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value 1s to use the data 1tem for ITC prov1ded on the Compustat data 
base Th1s was the source used 1n th1s study whenever poss1ble 
For f1rms that use the deferral method of account1ng for ITC, a 
separate approx1mat1on was be made by us1ng the amount of purchases of 
personal property calculated as descr1bed 1n the sect1on on deprec1a-
t1on changes, above These outlays for personal property were treated 
as that year's amount of purchases of qual1f1ed 1nvestment property, 
and mult1ply1ng that amount by the appropr1ate percentage gave and 
est1mate of the cash flow effect of ITC 1n that year 
In the years follow1ng the change 1n the ITC rate 1n 1975, the tax 
effect of the change was approx1mated by mult1ply1ng the total ITC, as 
computed above, by 30% (the rate 1ncreased from 7% to 10%) In the 
years follow1ng 1986 1n wh1ch the ITC was repealed, the cash flow 
effect of not hav1ng the ITC was calculated 1n a manner s1m1lar to the 
calculat1on of ITC under the deferral method, above 
Research and Development Cred1t 
In 1981 a 25% cred1t for 1ncreases 1n research and development was 
created An approx1mat1on of the tax effect of th1s change was ob-
ta1ned from the reconc1l1at1on percentage 
Tax Rate Changes 
In 1979 the max1mum corporate tax rate was reduced to 46% from 
48% In 1987 the max1mum corporate rate was reduced from 46% to 40%, 
and the next year 1t was reduced to 34% The cash flow effect of these 
decreases 1n rates was determ1ned by mult1ply1ng the change 1n rates by 
an est1mate of taxable 1ncome Th1s est1mate was obta1ned by add1ng 
back to (subtract~ng from) net ~ncome the deferred tax prov~s~on 
(cred~t) d~v~ded by the preva~l~ng max~mum tax rate ~n the year the 




SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES INVESTIGATED 
88 
VARIABLE N MEAN 
SYS RISK 68 1 19167647 
TOT RISK 68 0 01318088 
UNSYS RISK 68 0 00922353 
L 68 0 46391471 
D 68 0 94794412 
E 68 0 18848382 
c 68 0 87358971 
A 68 6 52159559 
F 68 3 73529412 
v 68 0 00213250 
F * V 68 0 01371074 
w;wo 68 1 21744926 
G a 
~ 
68 0 13694118 
G c 
~ 68 0 22930882 
p 68 0 35914706 
w;woa 68 0 98516765 
W/W00 68 0 98750000 
B 68 0 57990588 
L = leverage 
D d1v1dend payout rat1o 
E = earn1ngs var1ab1l1ty 
C = market concentrat1on 
A = asset s1ze 
F = frequency of tax changes 
STD DEV MINIMUM 
0 36272809 0 27040000 
0 00962162 0 00310000 
0 00884947 0 00160000 
0 19186158 0 06220000 
4 36758718 -0 19690000 
0 71387605 0 00290000 
0 15040115 0 48770000 
1 52549641 3 65240000 
1 70703240 1 00000000 
0 01016697 0 00003000 
0 07122652 0 00004000 
0 26353285 0 88646000 
0 11073808 -0 05800000 
0 58590039 -1 20500000 
0 17376174 0 14500000 
0 06004420 0 77520000 
1 44326493 0 00710000 
9 56651713 -54 63220000 




















W/WO =the rat1o of the var1ance of the f1rm's cash flows w1th the 
effects of the tax changes to the var1ance of the f1rm's cash 
flows w1thout the effects of the tax changes 
W/WOa = W/WO adJusted for the effects of cash flow growth and asset 
S1Ze 
W/W00 = W/WO adJusted for the effects of cash flow growth 
G~ a = growth 1n assets 
G~ c = growth 1n cash flows 
P the rat1o of property, plant and equ1pment to total assets 
B = account1ng beta 
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APPENDIX D 
THE SAMPLE COMPANIES AND THE CALCULATED VARIABLES 
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TABLE V 
THE SAMPLE COMPANIES AND THE CALCULATED VARIABLES 
OBS NAME DNUM CNUM SYS TOT UNSYS L D E C A F v F*V W/WO Ga Gc P W/WOa W/WOc B 
1 AILEEN 2253 008878 0 27 0 025 0 024 0 28 0 00 0 13 0 87 3 65 6 0 00078 0 00467 0 97 ·0 06 0 09 0 39 1 01 0 29 
2 AMERICA 2761 024763 0 93 0 007 0 004 0 31 0 40 0 03 0 84 4 90 6 0 00028 0 00166 1 60 0 11 0 10 0 37 0 95 0 88 
3 AMERICA 3590 029609 0 77 0 015 0 013 0 39 35 80 0 16 0 95 4 65 4 0 00014 0 00058 0 97 0 01 0 77 0 51 1 11 1 56 
4 AMP INC 3678 031897 1 42 0 009 0 003 0 30 0 41 0 01 1 00 7 53 2 0 00007 0 00014 1 40 0 12 0 15 0 41 0 98 0 77 
5 AMOCO C 2911 031905 0 61 0 003 0 002 0 35 0 52 0 04 0 49 10 16 5 0 00063 0 00316 1 82 0 09 -0 01 0 72 0 95 0 57 
6 ANACOMP 3861 032375 1 75 0 032 0 024 0 96 0 00 0 09 0 99 5 73 5 0 00054 0 00271 0 99 0 68 -0 50 0 15 1 01 0 31 
7 ARTRA G 3960 043147 1 56 0 024 0 017 0 80 -0 06 0 17 1 00 5 12 3 0 00083 0 00250 0 92 0 26 0 42 0 19 0 93 1 30 
8 BAUSCH 3851 071707 1 13 0 006 0 002 0 39 0 34 0 01 1 00 6 75 3 0 00005 0 00015 1 25 0 12 0 26 0 23 0 98 0 88 
9 BORMAN' 5411 099855 0 66 0 042 0 041 1 02 -0 09 0 35 0 79 4 93 7 0 01122 0 07851 1 05 0 02 ·0 45 0 51 1 02 1 99 
10 BROWN G 3140 115657 0 96 0 006 0 003 0 44 0 41 0 10 0 91 6 52 2 0 00014 0 00028 1 29 0 06 0 09 0 21 1 01 0 88 
11 CARTER 5311 146227 1 28 0 013 0 008 0 72 5 93 0 05 0 86 7 58 2 0 00061 0 00122 1 07 0 08 0 12 0 39 1 00 0 81 
12 CHARTER 5172 161177 1 77 0 046 0 038 0 42 -0 01 2 55 0 95 6 16 5 0 00097 0 00484 0 99 0 07 0 69 0 16 1 01 0 27 
13 CHESAPE 2621 165159 1 25 0 008 0 003 0 47 0 33 0 03 0 52 6 34 6 0 00170 0 01018 1 57 0 13 0 10 0 72 0 78 0 41 
14 COACHME 3716 189873 1 42 0 017 0 011 0 36 0 65 0 03 1 00 4 88 2 0 00032 0 00063 1 02 0 21 0 81 0 24 1 04 0 03 
15 COMDISC 7377 200336 2 13 0 025 0 013 0 60 0 11 0 09 1 00 7 63 4 0 00546 0 02184 1 00 0 49 3 42 0 52 0 98 3 78 
16 COMMERC 5051 201723 1 04 0 008 0 005 0 46 0 19 0 03 0 92 5 69 6 0 00038 0 00231 1 40 0 06 0 10 0 22 1 00 0 94 
17 CORE IN 3825 218675 1 06 0 006 0 003 0 27 0 62 0 01 0 77 4 92 2 0 00004 0 00008 0 98 0 11 0 09 0 19 1 02 0 82 
18 CUMMINS 3510 231021 1 51 0 012 0 006 0 48 1 71 0 15 1 00 7 53 6 0 00214 0 01284 1 06 0 08 0 44 0 42 0 98 0 41 
19 DALLAS 3442 234569 0 80 0 008 0 006 0 51 1 84 0 06 1 00 5 46 2 0 00003 0 00006 0 99 0 09 0 05 0 23 1 02 1 01 
20 DATA GE 3570 237688 1 49 0 014 0 008 0 44 0 00 0 08 0 87 7 04 2 0 00013 0 00026 1 15 0 25 0 20 0 26 1 10 1 07 
21 DONALDS 3564 257651 1 47 0 011 0 005 0 38 0 26 0 02 1 00 5 19 3 0 00010 0 00030 1 25 0 08 0 32 0 36 1 01 0 30 
22 E-SYSTE 3812 269157 1 23 0 008 0 004 0 29 0 25 0 01 0 95 6 38 1 0 00004 0 00004 1 32 0 15 0 19 0 28 1 02 0 97 
23 EKCO GR 3460 282636 1 19 0 027 0 023 0 55 0 00 0 07 0 94 5 09 1 0 00004 0 00004 0 99 0 17 -1 21 0 16 1 00 1 15 
24 ETHYL C 2800 297659 1 40 0 009 0 004 0 34 0 25 0 02 0 77 7 78 5 0 00141 0 00707 1 27 0 19 0 05 0 37 0 86 0 78 
25 EXXON C 2911 302290 0 76 0 003 0 001 0 30 0 52 0 03 0 49 11 16 5 0 00126 0 00629 1 61 0 06 0 05 0 67 0 91 0 80 
26 FABRI-C 5940 302846 0 90 0 012 0 010 0 48 0 72 0 08 1 00 4 77 3 0 00015 0 00045 1 03 0 14 0 03 0 22 1 00 0 92 
27 FEDERAL 3714 313549 1 18 0 007 0 003 0 43 0 55 0 04 0 63 6 60 3 0 00032 0 00097 1 92 0 07 0 02 0 40 0 95 0 88 
28 FLORIDA 4011 340632 1 10 0 007 0 003 0 06 0 07 0 01 0 67 6 19 4 0 00019 0 00076 1 08 0 12 0 23 0 73 0 99 0 92 
29 FLUOR C 1600 343861 1 28 0 011 0 007 0 46 -0 20 0 22 0 94 7 89 3 0 00036 0 00107 0 89 0 18 -0 27 0 50 0 95 0 53 
30 FUQUA I 7384 361028 1 30 0 008 0 003 0 58 0 08 0 02 1 00 6 60 5 0 00015 0 00073 1 08 0 10 0 00 0 18 1 02 0 79 
31 GENCORP 3760 368682 1 17 0 012 0 008 0 60 0 19 0 09 0 94 7 45 6 0 00052 0 00312 1 13 0 00 0 47 0 35 1 01 0 40 
32 HARLAND 2780 412693 1 07 0 006 0 002 0 16 0 34 0 01 1 00 5 31 3 0 00004 0 00011 1 38 0 21 0 22 0 41 1 09 0 74 
33 HEILIG· 5712 422893 1 52 0 012 0 005 0 64 0 22 0 02 1 00 5 89 2 0 00005 0 00011 1 22 0 20 0 23 0 18 0 91 0 82 
34 HEWLETT 3570 428236 1 37 0 009 0 004 0 30 0 09 0 00 0 87 8 79 2 0 00006 0 00012 1 28 0 19 0 18 0 34 0 95 0 91 
35 ILLINOI 3089 452308 1 51 0 009 0 003 0 38 0 23 0 02 0 89 6 90 3 0 00017 0 00050 0 93 0 18 0 14 0 26 1 09 1 20 
36 INTL BU 3570 459200 0 86 0 004 0 001 0 30 0 45 0 01 0 87 10 97 2 0 00029 0 00057 1 41 0 13 0 10 0 42 1 06 0 84 
37 INTL MU 2040 460043 0 80 0 005 0 003 0 49 0 48 0 03 0 99 6 49 4 0 00018 0 00073 1 17 0 07 0 20 0 30 1 05 0 52 
38 JOHNSON 3822 478366 0 95 0 006 0 003 0 49 0 41 0 02 1 00 7 40 5 0 00031 0 00155 1 57 0 22 0 40 0 33 0 92 0 95 
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TABLE V (Cont1nued) 
OBS NAME DNUM CNUM SYS TOT UNSYS L D E c A F V F*V W/~ Ga Gc P W/WOa W/~c B 
40 LTV COR 3312 502210 1 48 0 031 0 025 0 38 0 00 5 41 0 72 8 72 4 0 00357 0 01428 1 08 0 10 0 52 0 47 1 07 0 11 ·54 63 
41 LOWE'S 5211 548661 1 38 0 010 0 005 0 44 0 25 0 02 1 00 6 82 2 0 00004 0 00007 1 14 0 15 0 16 0 37 1 08 0 98 1 12 
42 MEREDIT 2721 589433 1 15 0 007 0 003 0 24 0 22 0 01 1 00 6 30 4 0 00010 0 00042 1 30 0 12 0 16 0 21 1 00 0 90 0 54 
43 MOHASCO 2510 608030 1 59 0 025 0 018 0 50 0 31 0 07 0 87 6 04 3 0 00034 0 00103 0 99 0 04 2 01 0 36 0 91 0 60 -0 24 
44 MUNSING 2340 626320 1 40 0 018 0 012 0 59 0 00 0 35 1 00 4 39 2 0 00008 0 00016 0 99 0 04 0 28 0 20 1 00 0 84 -0 27 
45 NALCO C 2890 629853 1 32 0 007 0 002 0 26 0 60 0 01 0 85 6 46 3 0 00006 0 00017 1 54 0 12 0 12 0 42 0 99 0 80 0 76 
46 PS GROU 5172 693624 0 73 0 008 0 006 0 62 0 20 0 15 0 95 6 78 7 0 08244 0 57705 1 42 0 10 0 42 0 63 0 95 0 01 0 74 
47 PHILLIP 2320 718592 1 15 0 012 0 008 0 48 0 15 0 01 0 94 5 64 2 0 00013 0 00025 1 16 0 04 0 42 0 16 0 95 0 93 0 41 
48 QUANEX 3312 747620 1 37 0 029 0 023 0 57 0 06 0 17 0 72 5 65 3 0 00008 0 00024 0 94 0 13 -0 89 0 53 0 98 3 17 0 26 
49 RALSTON 2040 751277 0 75 0 004 0 002 0 61 0 24 0 01 0 99 8 12 4 0 00028 0 00112 1 54 0 09 0 15 0 50 0 93 0 61 7 85 
50 RECOGNI 7373 756231 1 83 0 024 0 015 0 48 0 00 0 09 0 85 5 37 2 0 00041 0 00082 1 08 0 12 -0 19 0 18 1 00 0 51 ·0 06 
51 RYMER F 2013 783771 1 63 0 019 0 012 0 68 0 00 0 11 1 00 4 93 2 0 00079 0 00158 1 03 0 18 -0 49 0 15 0 99 0 61 0 41 
52 SAVIN C 5040 805176 0 71 0 038 0 037 1 12 0 00 0 45 1 00 5 42 4 0 00102 0 00407 0 94 0 15 0 00 0 23 0 90 2 04 0 58 
53 SCIENT! 3663 808655 1 42 0 013 0 008 0 25 0 18 0 05 0 94 5 67 1 0 00004 0 00004 1 16 0 24 0 51 0 18 0 98 0 38 0 40 
54 SCOTTY' 5211 810623 0 92 0 006 0 003 0 36 0 46 0 02 1 00 5 59 3 0 00014 0 00042 1 41 0 15 0 15 0 47 0 98 0 89 0 14 
55 SOUTHWE 4512 844741 1 12 0 009 0 005 0 38 0 09 0 04 0 59 6 93 7 0 00409 0 02866 2 06 0 37 0 31 0 84 0 99 0 02 0 45 
56 SUN ELE 3825 866713 1 79 0 019 0 010 0 54 0 00 0 08 0 77 5 06 2 0 00005 0 00011 0 94 0 10 ·0 16 0 18 0 99 0 23 ·0 12 
57 SUN CO 2911 866762 0 60 0 006 0 004 0 40 0 81 0 04 0 49 9 37 7 0 00110 0 00768 1 18 0 07 0 08 0 64 1 02 0 77 -14 92 
58 TITAN C 7373 888266 1 62 0 017 0 010 0 39 0 00 0 17 0 85 4 39 5 0 00021 0 00103 0 97 0 01 0 76 0 15 1 01 0 27 -0 22 
59 TONKA C 3944 890278 1 51 0 019 0 013 0 65 0 06 0 13 0 92 6 05 6 0 00026 0 00154 1 18 0 37 1 64 0 23 0 99 11 66 -0 30 
60 TYLER C 2851 902182 0 92 0 007 0 004 0 62 2 11 0 04 0 84 6 15 4 0 00013 0 00053 1 08 0 07 -0 03 0 32 1 00 0 72 0 02 
61 USG COR 3270 903293 1 55 0 013 0 007 0 71 2 26 0 05 1 00 7 52 5 0 00055 0 00275 1 37 0 07 0 14 0 58 0 94 0 82 2 15 
62 USAIR G 4512 911905 1 05 0 007 0 003 0 45 0 03 0 03 0 59 8 09 7 0 01527 0 10688 1 46 0 26 0 18 0 67 0 87 0 42 3 24 
63 UNIVERS 5150 913456 0 79 0 004 0 002 0 43 0 36 0 01 1 00 6 55 2 0 00005 0 00011 1 07 0 14 0 26 0 24 1 01 0 86 0 75 
64 WARNER 3652 934436 1 21 0 009 0 005 0 55 0 42 0 18 1 00 8 09 3 0 00010 0 00029 0 99 0 12 -0 02 0 16 1 00 0 85 5 33 
65 WEIS MA 5411 948849 0 70 0 005 0 003 0 13 0 26 0 01 0 79 6 18 3 0 00006 0 00019 1 30 0 15 0 14 0 30 0 86 0 68 1 15 
66 WHITEHA 3721 965010 1 34 0 013 0 008 0 11 0 00 0 07 0 93 4 36 4 0 00014 0 00056 1 06 0 11 0 28 0 30 1 03 0 78 -0 21 
67 WINN-01 5411 974280 0 76 0 004 0 002 0 45 0 62 0 01 0 79 7 20 2 0 00018 0 00035 1 37 0 11 0 10 0 38 0 93 0 79 0 47 





DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE COMPANIES BY SIC CODE 
SIC Code # of SIC Code # of SIC Code # of 
Range F1.rms Range F1.rms Range F1.rms 
1600 - 1700 1 3100 - 3200 1 4500 - 4600 2 
2000 - 2100 3 3200 - 3300 1 5000 - 5100 2 
2200 - 2300 1 3300 - 3400 2 5100 - 5200 3 
2300 - 2400 2 3400 - 3500 2 5200 - 5300 2 
2500 - 2600 1 3500 - 3600 6 5300 - 5400 1 
2600 - 2700 2 3600 - 3700 3 5400 - 5500 3 
2700 - 2800 3 3700 - 3800 4 5600 - 5700 1 
2800 - 2900 3 3800 - 3900 6 5700 - 5800 1 
2900 - 3000 3 3900 - 4000 2 5900 - 6000 1 
3000 - 3100 3 4000 - 4100 1 7300 - 7400 4 
Model Dependent 
Number Van.able 
1 Total R1sk 
2 Total R1sk 
3 Total R1sk 
4 Total R1sk 
5 Unsysternat1c R1sk 
6 Unsysternat1c R1sk 
7 Unsysternat1c R1sk 
8 Unsysternat1c R1sk 
9 Systernat1c R1sk 

















(See Table V for 
1nforrnat1on correspond-















CORRELATION ANALYSIS -- ALL VARIABLES AND 
ALL OBSERVATIONS INCLUDED 
SYS RSK TOT RSK UNS RSK L D E c 
SYS RSK 1 
TOT RSK 0 37849* 1 
UNS RSK 0 16257 0 97392* 1 
L 0 13427 0 53995* 0 54513* 1 
D -o 15431 -o 00989 0 0276 -0 02042 1 
E 0 17345 0 46158* 0 45546* 0 01189 -o 02526 1 
c 0 26988** 0 17632 0 12646 0 24831** 0 06592 -o 07099 1 
A -o 13392 -o 37309* -o 37101* -o 11364 -o 11828 0 11371 -o 41859* 
F -0 23035*** 0 08066 0 13518 0 16616 0 00298 0 07417 -o 36775* 
v -o 16239 -o 00967 0 02476 0 15379 -o 03431 0 02795 -o 01174 
F * V -o 17498 -o 02084 0 01653 0 14843 -o 03304 0 01212 -o 01209 
W/WO -o 3337* -o 53717* -o 49201* -o 28761** -o 11002 -o 15574 -o 49336* 
G a 0 42095* 0 14547 0 04839 0 20772*** -o 16974 -o 08072 0 11263 1c 0 31719* 0 07269 -o 0167 -o 07106 0 10615 0 09129 0 15259 G1 
p -o 33631* -0 25294** -0 19453 -0 17845 0 12253 -o 00137 -o 6472 * 
W/WOa 0 07333 0 17242 0 1677 -o 05172 0 24438** 0 18156 0 37998* 
W/WOc 0 12582 0 18265 0 16346 0 22551*** 0 03539 -o 069 0 07782 
B -o 13928 -o 30013** -o 28952** -o 04621 -o 00866 -o 67819* 0 11117 
A F v F * V W/WO G a 1 
F 0 17104 1 
v 0 05128 0 33598* 1 
F * V 0 04433 0 33567* 0 99944* 1 
W/WO 0 43099* 0 28417** 0 11292 0 11794 1 
G a 0 04877 -o 01556 -o 00674 -o 01673 0 0182 1 1 
G c 0 04927 0 11683 0 06267 0 0441 -o 06309 0 20809*** 1 
p 0 4911* 0 51434* 0 27869** 0 27488** 0 55424* -0 04705 
W/WOa -o 19947 -o 21703*** -o 11651 -o 11573 -o 42027* -o 0544 
W/WOc -o 05289 0 10111 -o 07451 -o 07855 -o 10762 0 3083 ** 
B 0 17457 -o 13556 -o 02303 -o 0119 0 18273 0 04101 
G·c 1 p W/W08 W/WOc 
p 0 06126 1 
W/W08 -0 0194 -o 30385** 1 
W/WOc 0 35424* -o 07116 0 03104 1 
B -o 06985 -o 0145 -o 10889 0 03323 
* 1nd1cates s1gn1f1cance at 1 percent level 
** 1nd1cates s1.gn1f1cance at 5 percent level 




The follow~ng coll~near~ty d~agnost~cs were generated us~ng the 
COLLIN opt~on for the REG procedure ~n the SAS stat~st~cal analys~s 
software Th~s opt~on 1s based on work by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
98 
[1980] The d~agnost~c procedure ~s as follows The cond~t~on numbers 
are f~rst 1nvest~gated to see ~f any are above 20 or 30 1n magn~tude 
If there are, then the proport~on of each var~able's total var~ance 
correspond~ng to the e~genvalues assoc~ated w~th these cond1t~on 
numbers are ~nvest~gated If any two or more of these var~ance propor-
t~ons are greater than 0 5, then there ~s a good chance that the 
coeff1c~ents and/or measured s1gn~f~cance of these var~ables have been 
affected by coll~near1ty between or among them 
For example, 1n the d~agnost~cs for Regress~on 1, there ~s one 
cond~t~on number greater than 20 There are three var~ance proport~ons 
greater than 0 5, so coll~near~ty m~ght be a factor ~n the coeff~c~ents 
and measured s~gn1f1cance of the 1ntercept, the ~ndustry concentrat1on 
(C), and the asset s~ze (A) var1ables The d~agnost~cs 1nd~cate that 
only one of the tax-change var~ables, W/WOa, has any problem w~th 
coll~near~ty It ~s apparently coll~near w~th the ~ntercept ~n every 
model ~n wh~ch ~t appears The most l~kely explanat~on for th~s ~s 
that the values of W/WOa are grouped very closely together, mak~ng no 
one part~cular coeff~c~ent (or slope) greatly preferable to any other 
from a least-squares perspect~ve There ~s apparent coll1near~ty 
because the slope determ~nes the ~ntercept, so as the slope 1ncreases 
(decreases), the ~ntercept decreases (1ncreases) 
The summary stat~st~cs ~n Append~x C lend we~ght to th~s conclu-
s~on because they ~nd~cate that W/WOa has a mean of 0 98517, and a 
standard dev~at~on of only 0 060044 Moreover, the range of the 
99 
var1able 1s only from 0 7752 to 1 1055 It should be po1nted out that 
the passable (a = 0 08) s1gn1f1cance of the coeff1c1ent of W/W0 8 1n 
Regress1on 3 1s probably not due to coll1near1ty w1th the 1ntercept 
Coll1near1ty can somet1mes cause an 1ns1gn1f1cant var1able to appear 
s1gn1f1cant by mak1ng the coeff1c1ent appear much larger than 1t really 
1s (one of the character1st1cs of coll1near1ty 1s 1ts effect on the 
stab1l1ty of the coeff1c1ents of the coll1near var1ables) S1nce the 
coeff1c1ent 1s the numerator of the t-stat1st1c, th1s makes the t-sta-
t1st1c larger than 1t should be, and the correspond1ng "s1gn1f1cance" 
appears better than 1t should be However, as the results of Regres-
s1on 3 show, the coeff1c1ent of W/W08 does not appear to be unusually 
large compared to the coeff1c1ent of W/W08 1n the other regress1ons 
TABLE VIII 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 1 
CONDITION VAR PROP VARIANCE PROPORTION 
EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP F L E c 
1 5 427634 1 000000 0 0003 0 0035 0 0037 0 0009 0 0006 
2 1 671392 1 802047 0 0000 0 0000 0 0000 0 1027 0 0000 
3 0 331399 4 046969 0 0005 0 0062 0 0003 0 0910 0 0005 
4 0 278832 4 411986 0 0002 0 0493 0 0094 0 5068 0 0001 
5 0 141661 6 189843 0 0007 0 4280 0 2187 0 0087 0 0204 
6 0 108994 7 056753 0 0084 0 1059 0 5476 0 0778 0 0190 
7 0 034632 12 518937 0 0017 0 2966 0 2142 0 1566 0 1582 
8 0 0054572 31 536904 0 9883 0 1104 0 0061 0 0556 0 8011 
100 
TABLE VIII (Contl.nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
A G a J. B 
1 0 0010 0 0087 0 0000 
2 0 0000 0 0007 0 1112 
3 0 0054 0 7611 0 1117 
4 0 0005 0 1795 0 4100 
5 0 0067 0 0452 0 0175 
6 0 0351 0 0001 0 1084 
7 0 4502 0 0000 0 1469 
8 0 5011 0 0047 0 0942 
TABLE IX 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 2 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP V L E C 
1 4 775910 1 000000 0 0004 0 0068 0 0047 0 0019 0 0007 
2 1 641854 1 705535 0 0000 0 0100 0 0001 0 1143 0 0001 
3 0 800728 2 442224 0 0002 0 7498 0 0002 0 0083 0 0008 
4 0 354913 3 668319 0 0003 0 0075 0 0001 0 2847 0 0003 
5 0 268304 4 219046 0 0014 0 0184 0 0292 0 4053 0 0020 
6 0 109339 6 609079 0 0055 0 0233 0 7110 0 0672 0 0003 
7 0 043142 10 521449 0 0076 0 1144 0 2491 0 0234 0 1885 
8 0 0058090 28 673372 0 9846 0 0700 0 0057 0 0949 0 8074 
101 
TABLE IX (Cont1nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
A Gia B 
1 0 0014 0 0112 0 0000 
2 0 0001 0 0015 0 1350 
3 0 0004 0 0003 0 0085 
4 0 0042 0 4262 0 3251 
5 0 0006 0 5382 0 2961 
6 0 0752 0 0017 0 0690 
7 0 3164 0 0002 0 0246 
8 0 6017 0 0207 0 1416 
TABLE X 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 3 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP w;woa L 
1 5 567835 1 000000 0 0001 0 0001 0 0038 
2 1 816733 1 750643 0 0000 0 0000 0 0001 
3 0 333480 4 086091 0 0002 0 0002 0 0018 
4 0 122315 6 746873 0 0004 0 0004 0 8015 
5 0 106737 7 222463 0 0004 0 0007 0 0516 
6 0 043460 11 318692 0 0002 0 0015 0 1093 
7 0 0084420 25 681541 0 0423 0 0572 0 0126 
8 0 0009968 74 736068 0 9565 0 9399 0 0194 
102 
TABLE X (Cont~nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A G a 1 B 
1 0 0006 0 0005 0 0010 0 0081 0 0000 
2 0 0441 0 0000 0 0000 0 0013 0 0516 
3 0 0023 0 0014 0 0027 0 9119 0 0088 
4 0 0308 0 0001 0 0373 0 0311 0 0336 
5 0 7181 0 0050 0 0024 0 0145 0 6863 
6 0 1659 0 1155 0 3966 0 0164 0 1296 
7 0 0372 0 8641 0 4014 0 0146 0 0580 
8 0 0009 0 0136 0 1586 0 0022 0 0321 
TABLE XI 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 4 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP W/WOc L 
1 5 300096 1 000000 0 0003 0 0082 0 0040 
2 1 631558 1 802356 0 0000 0 0013 0 0000 
3 0 358280 3 846189 0 0005 0 0456 0 0000 
4 0 308147 4 147274 0 0001 0 3501 0 0077 
' 5 0 238439 4 714693 0 0032 0 5375 0 0177 
6 0 108515 6 988702 0 0050 0 0555 0 8164 
7 0 048704 10 431813 0 0042 0 0000 0 1540 
8 0 0062612 29 094674 0 9867 0 0019 0 0001 
103 
TABLE XI (Cont~nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A G a ~ B 
1 0 0012 0 0007 0 0011 0 0092 0 0001 
2 0 1242 0 0000 0 0000 0 0006 0 1381 
3 0 3077 0 0009 0 0060 0 3007 0 3574 
4 0 0753 0 0001 0 0003 0 5934 0 0817 
5 0 3397 0 0060 0 0057 0 0838 0 2012 
6 0 0348 0 0009 0 0572 0 0002 0 0556 
7 0 0407 0 2063 0 2951 0 0014 0 0267 
8 0 0766 0 7851 0 6345 0 0106 0 1394 
TABLE XII 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 5 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCP W/WOa E G a ~ G c ~ p 
1 3 815509 1 000000 0 0001 0 0002 0 0069 0 0186 0 0146 0 0100 
2 0 933293 2 021935 0 0000 0 0000 0 8339 0 0120 0 0485 0 0020 
3 0 797615 2 187155 0 0001 0 0001 0 0795 0 0027 0 8643 0 0046 
4 0 329900 3 400834 0 0002 0 0002 0 0367 0 8370 0 0605 0 0929 
5 0 122483 5 581348 0 0033 0 0043 0 0095 0 1221 0 0112 0 7983 
6 0 0012006 56 373742 0 9963 0 9952 0 0334 0 0077 0 0008 0 0922 
104 
TABLE XIII 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 6 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP W/WOc E G a 1 G c 1 p 
1 3 709050 1 000000 0 0065 0 0145 0 0086 0 0195 0 0165 0 0105 
2 0 911520 2 017197 0 0006 0 0021 0 8181 0 0147 0 0239 0 0053 
3 0 759083 2 210480 0 0078 0 0015 0 0639 0 0075 0 7477 0 0078 
4 0 325010 3 378181 0 0124 0 0039 0 0092 0 7897 0 0010 0 1455 
5 0 228169 4 031842 0 0004 0 7311 0 0007 0 0836 0 1169 0 1723 
6 0 067168 7 431072 0 9724 0 2469 0 0996 0 0850 0 0941 0 6587 
TABLE XIV 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 7 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP F L 
1 5 261040 1 000000 0 0003 0 0039 0 0026 
2 0 998975 2 294872 0 0000 0 0004 0 0005 
3 0 492972 3 266816 0 0007 0 0124 0 0026 
4 0 141098 6 106256 0 0029 0 6015 0 0138 
5 0 064430 9 036331 0 0080 0 0023 0 9034 
6 0 035968 12 094162 0 0011 0 3038 0 0448 
7 0 0055168 30 880970 0 9870 0 0757 0 0322 
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TABLE XIV (Cont~nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A B 
1 0 0064 0 0006 0 0009 0 001 
2 0 0293 0 0000 0 0002 0 725 
3 0 4514 0 0008 0 0046 0 146 
4 0 0124 0 0299 0 0001 0 034 
5 0 4589 0 0064 0 0307 0 0012 
6 0 0243 0 1654 0 4412 0 0315 
7 0 0174 0 7969 0 5224 0 0587 
TABLE XV 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 8 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP v L 
1 4 122785 1 000000 0 0005 0 0097 0 0064 
2 1 772462 1 525130 0 0001 0 0036 0 0008 
3 0 805700 2 262084 0 0002 0 7784 0 0001 
4 0 137727 5 471232 0 0002 0 0010 0 0238 
5 0 111838 6 071559 0 0053 0 0247 0 7112 
6 0 043455 9 740422 0 0088 0 1211 0 2486 
7 0 0060333 26 140643 0 9850 0 0614 0 0090 
TABLE XV (Cont~nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A B 
1 0 0021 0 0010 0 0020 0 0003 
2 0 0572 0 0002 0 0001 0 0727 
3 0 0027 0 0008 0 0004 0 0036 
4 0 8560 0 0000 0 0003 0 8498 
5 0 0272 0 0002 0 0829 0 0149 
6 0 0001 0 1946 0 3323 0 0021 
7 0 0548 0 8033 0 5820 0 0565 
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TABLE XVI 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 9 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP w;woa L 
1 4 910910 1 000000 0 0001 0 0001 0 0043 
2 1 631571 1 734914 0 0000 0 0000 0 0000 
3 0 298278 4 057611 0 0000 0 0000 0 0157 
4 0 106924 6 777098 0 0011 0 0014 0 8020 
5 0 043522 10 622549 0 0003 0 0023 0 0685 
6 0 0076585 25 322585 0 0504 0 0703 0 0709 
7 0 0011380 65 690896 0 9481 0 9259 0 0385 
TABLE XVI (Cont1nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A B 
1 0 0014 0 0006 0 0012 0 0001 
2 0 1033 0 0000 0 0000 0 1226 
3 0 5882 0 0005 0 0024 0 5513 
4 0 0588 0 0010 0 0256 0 0679 
5 0 1147 0 1082 0 3969 0 1191 
6 0 0300 0 8792 0 4255 0 0953 
7 0 1035 0 0104 0 1485 0 0437 
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TABLE XVII 
COLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS FOR REGRESSION 10 
CONDITION VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER EIGENVALUE NUMBER INTERCEP W/WOc L 
1 4 630824 1 000000 0 0004 0 0109 0 0053 
2 1 793263 1 606968 0 0000 0 0026 0 0002 
3 0 274436 4 107795 0 0020 0 8943 0 0013 
4 0 135724 5 841183 0 0010 0 0216 0 0009 
5 0 109931 6 490374 0 0042 0 0696 0 8472 
6 0 049378 9 684208 0 0053 0 0000 0 1447 
7 0 0064448 26 805508 0 9871 0 0010 0 0005 
TABLE XVII (Cont~nued) 
VARIANCE PROPORTION 
NUMBER E c A B 
1 0 0011 0 0009 0 0016 0 0001 
2 0 0608 0 0000 0 0000 0 0731 
3 0 0026 0 0037 0 0101 0 0233 
4 0 8927 0 0004 0 0013 0 8526 
5 0 0003 0 0006 0 0606 0 0004 
6 0 0012 0 2117 0 3059 0 0010 
7 0 0414 0 7827 0 6205 0 0496 
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